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 EXPORTING MORALITY WITH TRADE 
RESTRICTIONS: THE WRONG PATH TO 
ANIMAL RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
n 1998, an undercover Humane Society1 investigation revealed that 
the largest coat retailer in America, Burlington Coat Factory, had 
been selling men’s parkas trimmed with dog fur imported from China.2 
Posing as American fur traders, investigators discovered that millions of 
dogs and cats throughout Asia were being slaughtered inhumanely for 
their pelts, while American consumers remained naive to the difference 
in stores because, when dyed, dog and cat fur is virtually indistinguishable 
from fox, rabbit, or coyote fur.3 The New York Times picked up the  
story immediately, and as public outrage ensued, the Humane Society 
took its findings to Congress.4 On November 9, 2000, the Dog and Cat 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. The Humane Society is a nonprofit U.S. animal protection group, which was  
established in 1954. For more information, see Humane Society of the United States, 
http://www.hsus.org/about_us/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
 2. Retailer Recalls Parkas Trimmed in Dog Fur, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, at B11 
[hereinafter Recall]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The following Congressional Findings were spurred by the Humane Society’s 
1998 report: 
An estimated 2,000,000 dogs and cats are slaughtered and sold annually as part 
of the international fur trade. Internationally, dog and cat fur is used in a wide 
variety of products, including fur coats and jackets, fur trimmed garments, hats, 
gloves, decorative accessories, stuffed animals, and other toys. 
  . . . The United States represents one of the largest markets for the sale of fur 
and fur products in the world . . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . Publicly available evidence reflects ongoing significant use of dogs and 
cats bred expressly for their fur by foreign fur producers for manufacture into 
wearing apparel, toys, and other products that have been introduced into United 
States commerce . . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . The trade of dog and cat fur products is ethically and aesthetically abhor-
rent to United States citizens. Consumers in the United States have a right to 
know if products offered for sale contain dog or cat fur and to ensure that they 
are not unwitting participants in this gruesome trade. 
Dog and Cat Protection Act of 2000: Findings and Purposes, Pub. L. No. 106–476, § 
1442, 114 Stat. 2163 (2000) [hereinafter Findings]. See also Humane Society of the Unit-
I 
1000 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
Protection Act (“DCPA”) made it unlawful to import any “dog or cat fur 
product” into the United States.5 
Having demonstrated that culture shock can be home delivered in the 
“flattening”6 global world, Chinese fur-farming practices left American 
pet lovers scowling eastward in bewilderment. The DCPA was a re-
sponse to public injury; had anthrax been discovered lurking in imported 
coats, consumers may have been no more provoked to xenophobia. But 
dog fur differs significantly from anthrax in that it poses no harm to human 
health. Thus, if not for the Humane Society drumming up hyperbolic 
headlines, Americans could have continued buying and wearing dog fur 
unknowingly and perhaps indefinitely. To believe that the United States 
is devoid of dog and cat fur today is to assume that the DCPA has been 
enforced flawlessly. But more recent investigations indicate otherwise; 
over the past two years, dog fur has been discovered on the racks at J.C. 
Penney,7 Macy’s,8 Nieman Marcus, and many other stores.9 Rejecting the 
age-old aphorism that “what you don’t know can’t hurt you,” the  
Humane Society has been lobbying for a “Dog and Cat Fur Prohibition 
Enforcement Act” since 2007.10 This begs an obvious question—how 
many Americans unwittingly sport dog fur at present?—but there are 
many other important questions that have not been addressed in regard to 
this uniquely American legislative initiative premised on moral superiority. 
                                                                                                                                     
ed States, Dog and Cat Fur: Aftermath of an HSUS Investigation, http://www.hsus.org/ 
furfree/dogs_cats/betrayal/dog_and_cat_fur_aftermath.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
 5. The Dog and Cat Protection Act of 2000 provides, in relevant part: 
In general, [i]t shall be unlawful for any person to 
  . . . import into, or export from, the United States any dog or cat fur product; or 
  . . . introduce into interstate commerce, manufacture for introduction into in-
terstate commerce, sell, trade, or advertise in interstate commerce, offer to sell, 
or transport or distribute in interstate commerce in the United States, any dog or 
cat fur product. 
Dog and Cat Protection Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 1308 (2000). 
 6. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2006) (discussing 
globalization). 
 7. Fur Flies as Penney Restocks Dog-fur Coats, MSNBC, Jan. 12, 2007, http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/id/16597610. 
 8. Macy’s Pulls Sean John Hooded Jackets over Use of Dog Fur, FOX NEWS, Dec. 
26, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,238864,00.html. 
 9. Humane Society Urges Crackdown on Dog Fur, MSNBC, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/id/17584385/. 
 10. Humane Soc’y of the U.S., Dog Scandal Pushes New Fur Labeling Bill, Feb. 7, 
2007, http://www.hsus.org/furfree/news/fur_labeling_bill_introduced.html. See also H.R. 
891, 110th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2007). 
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It is a truism that Westerners broadly and vehemently oppose animal 
cruelty and that Americans are generally fond of domesticated dogs—
however, a consensus in opposition to cruel treatment is far from an 
agreement on the proper scope of animal “rights.” Activists call for the 
broadest possible scope of protection,11 while scientists, consumers, con-
sumer advocates, legislators, and journalists take varying, less compre-
hensive stances.12 The 1998 Humane Society investigation that led to the 
DCPA was but another call to arms—an attempt to mobilize a generally 
indifferent public to stand up and do something about global animal suf-
fering. A report describing puppies “strangled, bludgeoned, clubbed or 
bled to death”13 for their fur seems certain to garner unique attention in a 
nation where “pet lovers” are a large and uncontroversial group; but this 
group offers passive sympathy, which, to activists who literally embody 
the animal welfare cause, may seem unfortunately insufficient.14 Many 
activists seek nothing short of an end to human consumption of omelets 
and milk,15 but it is worth considering whether ordinary Americans 
would have been as outraged in 2000 had headlines told of dogs killed 
painlessly amidst a detrimental animal overpopulation in a region where 
selling fur to a thriving American fashion market was the only way many 
poverty-stricken farmers could feed their families.16 
It is implicit that fewer Americans protest when foxes, rabbits, or 
coyotes are killed for coats. And it is demonstrable that self-described 
                                                                                                                                     
 11. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 12. Various arguments stand in the way of an extremist animal rights agenda. For 
instance, some scientists have claimed that animal testing is “the only way of conducting 
important research into worldwide diseases such as HIV.” Demian Hobby, Activist Cleared 
as Oxford Opens Animal Testing Facility, JOURNAL, Nov. 23, 2008, http://www.journal-
online.co.uk/article/5086-activist-cleared-as-oxford-opens-animal-testing-facility. It has 
also been argued that veganism can cause dangerous if not fatal protein deficiency, to 
such an extent that vegan pregnancy may be “irresponsible.” Nina Planck, Death by  
Veganism, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2007, at A19. Furthermore, regulators and consumer-
protection groups may argue that a more appropriate public priority is to protect humans 
from animals rather than to protect animals from humans. See Agriculture Dept. Wants 
Meat Inspectors to Focus on Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, at A23 (quoting an 
associate within the U.S. Department of Agriculture who said in 2000, “We’re trying to 
make sure our resources are devoted to food safety . . . . That’s our first priority . . . .”). 
 13. Recall, supra note 2. 
 14. See generally Michael Specter, The Extremist, NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 2003, at 52 
(profiling an “extremist” animal rights group leader). 
 15. See id. at 54, 56. 
 16. Chinese State Forestry Administration Deputy Chairman Zhao Xuemin has spo-
ken out against the dog and cat fur trade, but has noted that it is unfortunately driven by 
economic hardship. China Pledges to Stop Cat and Dog Fur Trade, IRELAND. ONLINE, 
May 24, 2006, http://breakingnews.iol.ie/news/?c=ireland&jp=cwgbaucweyql. 
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animal sympathizers (those who want to save dogs but enjoy steak) are 
much less interested in helping animals when it means they must incur 
life-changing costs in the process.17 Sympathizers lured to the activist 
movement by outrageous images of cruelty may begin to have second 
thoughts when the totality of the animal rights agenda becomes clear.18 
The only way to escape hypocrisy is to assert that the proper scope of 
animal rights is a question on which reasonable minds can disagree. 
Disagree they do, and even though activism has been growing in power 
and persuasiveness,19 drastic reforms still seem unimaginably distant. 
Some activists, bolstered by scholars and scientists, have concluded that 
humans should treat animals as equals.20 Still, others who take on the 
issue assert that the debate remains mired in nuance.21 Legislators have 
been left to act on the majoritarian sentiments of the moment, and thus, 
activists have been left to act on the morals of the majority. 
To Americans who do not plan to abandon their hamburgers, the 
DCPA may serve as guilt reduction. Surely, Americans know when they 
sit down to eat pork chops that a living animal22 was born, raised, and 
then killed—perhaps painfully—for the sake of the meal. And with activists’ 
reminders all the more frequent and public, it may feel quite redeeming 
to find an animal welfare law that is easy to get on board with—a law 
that will seemingly help animals but will not require alterations to the 
customary and ingrained ways of living in America. 
In the end, however, it seems shortsighted to claim possession of a 
simple and clear (and globally applicable) answer to broad questions of 
human duty to animals. There are too many obscure factors and view-
points that must be included in the calculus, and it is too easy to unkno-
wingly allow ingrained prejudicial beliefs to dictate one’s judgment. 
Some observers may form conclusions about animal treatment in the East 
without even scratching the surface of fundamental questions like, why 
                                                                                                                                     
 17. Cass R. Sunstein, A Tribute to Kenneth L. Karst: Standing for Animals (with 
Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1364 (2000) (arguing that while U.S. 
laws prevent infliction of gratuitous pain on animals, animals still lose whenever their 
interests require balancing against human interests). 
 18. Reductio ad absurdum, the logical extension of the animal rights agenda is that 
animals are our equals and harming an animal is the same as harming a human. See Spec-
ter, supra note 14, at 58. 
 19. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 20. See generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 1 (1975) (arguing that the  
“ethical principle on which human equality rests requires us to extend equal consideration 
to animals too”). 
 21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See also discussion infra Part I.B. 
 22. See, e.g., E.B. WHITE, CHARLOTTE’S WEB (1952) (chronicling Wilbur the talking 
pig’s miraculous avoidance of slaughter). 
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would such treatment differ geographically? To what extent should 
Western legal regimes premise their ideals on “universal truths”? When 
is it okay to impose one’s moral code on others? To what extent can  
humans parse meaningful differences among similar species of animals? 
To what extent would those differences be relevant to the treatment of 
animals? Should there be a hierarchy by which some animals are treated 
more favorably than others? Why is it “wrong” to wear dog fur but not 
fox fur in America? When is emotional harm as severe as physical harm 
when resulting from imported products? And, finally, when exactly is it 
okay to prohibit the importation of foreign products on the basis of  
morality under the long-standing General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”)?23 
All of these questions deserve more than passing consideration before 
laws with broad international impact are enacted at the behest of emo-
tion. This Note will argue that the Dog and Cat Protection Act of 2000 is 
an ill-conceived federal statute and that Congress should not waste time 
or federal resources enacting, let alone debating, the presently pending 
Dog and Cat Prohibition Enforcement Act.24 This argument should not 
be construed as a judgment as to the scope or nature of the duty humans 
owe to animals; rather, it is a judgment regarding the nature of morality-
based trade restrictions and is rooted in pragmatic policy analysis of 
normative moral reasoning, competitive economic efficiency, and the 
principles of international free trade agreements. 
Part I of this Note will critique normative moral theory with respect to 
its fundamental role in animal welfare proselytizing, its applicability to 
legal theory, and its usefulness as a basis for legal decision making. Part 
II will discuss international trade disputes arising over morality-based 
domestic import restrictions in order to examine why the GATT has con-
sistently been interpreted to err on the side of free trade and consumer 
choice. Finally, Part III will argue that the DCPA is not only an ineffec-
tive and unenforceable law but also potentially counterproductive to the 
goals of the Western animal welfare movement and overly costly to 
global trade infrastructure in light of more effective alternatives. 
I. ACTIVISM AND NORMATIVE MORAL REASONING: PIG, SHEEP, DOG, 
FOREIGNER, AMERICAN? 
Even in progressive American families, children will not be scolded 
for ranking their favorite animals. They may judge these animals arbitra-
                                                                                                                                     
 23. See discussion infra Part II. 
 24. This presently pending statute would improve enforcement of the DCPA. See 
discussion infra Part III.B. 
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rily by attributes like “pretty colors,” “scary tusks,” or “awesome shell,” 
and cartoons and other media may help them form misleading concep-
tions about animal personalities, but this is okay. There is no need for 
alarm so long as they are not ranking humans. Science has done good 
work clearing up long-held misconceptions about skin-tone and ethnicity-
based differences,25 and today, billions of humans expressing themselves 
through hundreds of collaborating governments seem to agree on the ex-
istence of something called fundamental or “natural” human rights.26  
Encompassing many of these rights is the amorphous notion of “liberty,” 
conceived and elaborated on by an oft-touted laundry list of classic 
thinkers and writers who have had unparalleled influence on the Western 
world.27 
When “natural” rights exist in or are enforced via constitution28 or  
international agreement,29 these rights can be seen as mere terms in a 
contract binding those who have agreed to be bound.30 But when it is 
asserted that such rights belong to or must be imposed on those who have 
                                                                                                                                     
 25. See MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 
13 (1993) (“[D]ifferences [among] the average members of different races are actually 
tiny and are mostly confined to a few genes that affect skin color, physiognomy, or  
physique.”). 
 26. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”), enacted in 
1948, binds 192 Member States of the United Nations. The preamble to the Universal 
Declaration provides that the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,  
justice and peace in the world.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A 
(III), at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [he-
reinafter UDHR]. 
 27. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 283 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge University Press) (1824) (“The natural liberty of man is to be free from any 
superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but 
to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under 
no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth.”); 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 14 (Random House 2002) (1859) (arguing that human 
liberty comprises, among other things, freedom of “thought and feeling,” “absolute free-
dom of opinion,” and freedom to express, publish, and unite). 
 28. See generally U.S. CONST. amend I–X (providing that certain rights cannot be 
abridged by Congress, for example, “freedom of speech” and freedom from “unreasona-
ble search and seizure”). 
 29. See UDHR, supra note 26, ¶ 3 (providing that no U.N. Member State shall  
deprive its human citizens of certain rights, for example, “life, liberty and security of 
person”). 
 30. See LOCKE, supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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not sought to be bound,31 the asserter is laying claim to the possession of 
universally applicable “truth.”32 To hold “self-evident”33 that liberty is 
universally inherent to human nature is to claim that nonliberal senti-
ments (and thus, nonliberal societies) are necessarily “wrong”—wrong in 
the same way that “two plus two equals five” is wrong. This is the asser-
tion of “moral realism” (also known as “universalism”) at its logical 
ends.34 
“Moral relativism,” on the other hand, fights nature with “nurture,” and 
proposes that moral codes do not merit sweeping claims at objective 
truth.35 Relativists argue that cultures can simply possess “different” 
moral codes, that morality is shaped by the “exigencies of life” in a given 
society, and that those who believe otherwise are simply blinded by the 
codes ingrained in their own social set.36 The debate between universal-
ism and relativism is as fundamental to the question of animal rights as it 
has been to the question of human rights, at least in regard to the stance 
Westerners take toward those in the global community who operate “dif-
ferently.”37 Per these superficially simple definitions, it may be obvious 
that animal rights activists tend toward a theory of moral universalism. 
This section does not pine for a theory of relativism but, rather, puts forth 
a nuanced conception of morality as a locally adaptive system of social 
control. Expanding on a view presented by Judge Richard Posner in his 
book The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, this section argues 
that, alone, a society’s ingrained moral codes serve as a generally poor 
premise for the enactment of restrictions on international product impor-
tation. 
A. Metaethics and Animal Utilitarianism 
Moral universalism and moral relativism are the two most prominent 
metaethical perspectives on normative moral theory.38 Normative theory 
first asks, “By what standards should conduct be labeled ‘right’ or 
                                                                                                                                     
 31. Meaning the governments of foreign nations that have not sought to join, for  
instance, the United Nations (and thus have not sought to be bound by the Universal  
Declaration). 
 32. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 34. For a discussion of moral realism, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS 
OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 17 (1999). 
 35. Id. at 6–8. 
 36. Id. at 19. 
 37. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Moral Realism” (2005), http://plato.stanford. 
edu/entries/moral-realism. 
 38. Id. 
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‘wrong’”?39 Metaethics then asks whether “rightness” and “wrongness” 
exist independent of human judgment.40 In addition to universalism and 
relativism, there are other derivative metaethical perspectives such as 
“pluralism,”41 “subjectivism,”42 and “skepticism,”43 and each presents a 
different understanding of the elusive nature of truth with respect to moral 
inquiry. 
Within normative theory, the two most prominent standards for labe-
ling conduct “right” or “wrong” are “deontology” and “consequential-
ism.”44 Deontology posits that conduct should be valued in reasoned con-
sideration of one’s duty to others.45 For example, Immanuel Kant’s46 
“Categorical Imperative” provides that one should act “only on that max-
im” for which he or she would “at the same time will that it should  
become a universal law.”47 Kant criticized the inhumane treatment of 
animals on the basis that empathy is essential to human adherence to the 
imperative.48 Consequentialism, on the other hand, assigns value to con-
duct solely on the basis of its consequences.49 Utilitarianism is a theory 
of consequentialism that proposes a battle between “pleasure” and “pain” 
(words as amorphous as liberty), and provides that humans should live so 
as to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number.50 Utilitarianism 
has undergirded countless historical notions of justice and social duty, 
including, most notably, general deterrence theories of criminal punish-
                                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1086 (8th ed. 2004). 
 40. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Metaethics” (2007), http://plato.stanford. 
edu/entries/metaethics. 
 41. “Moral pluralism” claims that there can be more than one scale to weigh “value”; 
thus, values can be incommensurable such that an attempt to balance them is misguided. 
For instance, consider the question of whether “justice” is better than “loyalty” (or 
whether law professor is a “better” profession than philosophy professor). See POSNER, 
supra note 34, at 8. 
 42. “Moral subjectivism” claims that one’s “morality” can be judged only per com-
pliance with whatever moral code one has chosen for oneself. Id. at 9. 
 43. “Moral skepticism” speculates that moral truth is completely unknowable. Id. 
 44. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Deontological Ethics” (2007), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 637–52 (1946). 
 47. IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 
(1785). See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (arguing that morality is 
intuited in what all humans would willingly subject themselves to). 
 48. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to 
Animals 14–16 (2004), available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK. 
FellowCreatures.pdf. 
 49. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Consequentialism” (2006), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism. 
 50. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 239 (Random House 2002) (1871). 
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ment.51 Moreover, utilitarianism has been the value scale of choice for 
one of the most prolific academic animal rights activists of all, Princeton 
University bioethics professor Peter Singer.52 Singer includes animals in 
his utilitarian morality calculus such that the addition of their “pain” 
would weigh in drastically to render mankind terribly immoral.53 
While Singer is the academic animal rights pioneer—the “activist” 
who lends extra credibility to the cause—he is not the face of outraged 
protest. His 1975 book Animal Liberation, however, was the catalyst that 
moved Ingrid Newkirk to found the notoriously controversial group 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”).54 Today even the 
Humane Society, for all its feats, is shrinking in both power and popularity 
next to the organization known for covertly infiltrating fashion shows 
and unfurling signs that read (in one instance) “Gisele: Fur Scum.”55 
Both PETA and the Humane Society offer “lobbying” guides on their 
websites to explain how regular citizens can effectively engage Congres-
sional representatives, but PETA’s website also includes an “everyday 
activism” guide, which explains how regular citizens can stir up contro-
versy and outrage on their own, all the time.56 PETA.org provides “all 
the information that you’ll need to hold a successful demonstration.”57 
Ingrid Newkirk, as PETA’s leader, is the resident captain of activism, 
and she commands an ever-burgeoning fleet.58 According to Newkirk, 
animal sympathizers who decry abuse but then fail to renounce their 
                                                                                                                                     
 51. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14–15 (2006). See also 
MILL, supra note 50, at 283 (“And hence the sentiment of injustice came to be attached, 
not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such laws as ought to exist, including 
such as ought to exist but do not.”). 
 52. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 5. See also Richard A. Posner & Peter Singer, E-
mail Debates of Noteworthy Topics: Animal Rights, SLATE, Jun. 12, 2001, http://www.slate. 
com/id/110101/entry/110109/. 
 53. Singer claims that humans engage in “speciesism,” which is just like sexism or 
racism. He argues that the “only acceptable limit to [human] moral concern is the point at 
which there is no awareness of pain or pleasure.” In other words, humans owe a duty not 
to cause pain to anything that can feel pain. See Posner & Singer, supra note 52. 
 54. Specter, supra note 14, at 60. 
 55. Id. at 52. 
 56. Humane Society Citizen Lobbyist Center, http://www.hsus.org/legislation_laws/ 
citizen_lobbyist_center/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2008); PETA’s Legislative Guide, http://www. 
peta.org/actioncenter/leg.asp (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
 57. PETA’s Everyday Activism Guide, http://www.peta.org/actioncenter/act.asp (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
 58. Newkirk founded PETA in 1980; today the group boasts over two million mem-
bers, annual donations in excess of $25 million, and over 50 million hits received at its 
various websites. For more information, see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
About, http://www.peta.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
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leather belts are but hypocrites who remain a large part of the global  
animal welfare problem.59 It is Newkirk’s mission to make full vegans of 
all who will listen,60 so PETA seeks to lure as many followers as possi-
ble, often with shock tactics.61 
One of PETA’s most shocking (and perhaps effective) ploys has been 
to display on its website actual video footage of dogs abused and slaugh-
tered in China.62 It is perhaps a truism that sympathizers are best baited 
to the cause with horrifying images of animal suffering.63 But in solicit-
ing and receiving support from sympathizers who, despite being outraged 
at such footage, inevitably remain meat eaters (i.e., “murderers”), PETA 
has been forced to compromise the totality of its principles to an extent—
to put the “steak equals death” chants on brief pause.64 
When a magazine reported several years ago that Ben Affleck had 
bought a chinchilla coat for Jennifer Lopez, PETA mailed Affleck a 
graphic video (and explanatory letter) detailing the process by which 
nearly one hundred chinchillas are killed to make a single garment: 
The preferred method of killing chinchillas is by genital electrocution: 
a method whereby the handler attaches an alligator clamp to the ani-
mal’s ear and another to her genitalia and flips a switch, sending a jolt 
of electricity through her skin down the length of her body. The elec-
trical current causes unbearable muscle pain, at the same time working 
as a paralyzing agent, preventing the animal from screaming or fight-
ing.65 
Affleck wrote back: “You have opened my eyes to a particularly cruel 
and barbaric treatment of animals. I can assure you I do not endorse such 
treatment and will not do anything in the future that supports it.”66 Years 
later, while Ben’s brother Casey is listed among “Famous Hollywood 
Vegetarians,” Ben is not.67 
                                                                                                                                     
 59. See Specter, supra note 14, at 58. 
 60. See id. 
 61. For instance, PETA has employed models and celebrities to pose for implied nude 
photos that tout the slogan, “I’d rather go naked than wear fur.” Id. 
 62. A Shocking Look Inside Chinese Fur Farms, http://www.peta.org/feat/ChineseFur 
Farms/index.asp (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
 63. See Posner and Singer, supra note 52. 
 64. Specter, supra note 14, at 67. 
 65. Id. at 52. 
 66. Id. 
 67. International Vegetarian Union—Famous Vegetarians, http://www.ivu.org/people/ 
actors/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). 
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The cost Americans are willing to incur in changing their lives and ha-
bits for animals remains minimal despite appalling videos.68 Humans 
may feel noble when they cry out against cruelty for the domesticated 
pets of the West—but their sympathies may best be described as selec-
tive attention, cognitive dissonance, or even willful ignorance when they 
continue choosing to wear or eat other animals. There are minimal 
grounds on which to argue that importing fox, rabbit, coyote, wolf, or 
chinchilla fur is morally justifiable compared to importing “dog” fur. A 
Burlington Coat Factory spokesman said defensively in 2000, “[W]e 
were outraged . . . . [T]he purchase order actually called for coyote 
trim.”69 A spokeswoman for the Fur International Council of America (a 
profur group, no less) explained, “[O]ur position is that dog and cat fur 
should not be sold in the United States . . . . Culturally, it goes against 
our grain to do so. It’s just not something we want to see happening.”70 
Furthermore, under the Congressional “Findings and Purposes” listed 
with the legislative history of the DCPA, the law was justified on the 
basis that “the trade of dog and cat fur products is ethically and aestheti-
cally abhorrent to United States citizens.”71 
To be fair, there are plenty of domestic laws rooted in moral norms.72 
But laws that restrict trade serve to impose American moral norms on 
foreign societies. When nations hold distinctly incompatible moral codes, 
each side surely feels “right” in the same way that each side feels “right” 
in the incomparably divisive American debate over abortion.73 Both sides 
wish to label the other morally inferior, and all arguments aspire to the 
persuasiveness of objective, mathematical truth.74 When Americans  
                                                                                                                                     
 68. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 69. Recall, supra note 2 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. See also Fur Information Council of America, http://www.fur.org/about_fica.cfm 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (providing “facts that counter the distortions and misrepre-
sentations” proffered by animal welfare groups). 
 71. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 72. Plenty of laws resemble moral dictates, but most also serve overarching societal 
functions. For instance, it may be a moral norm that stealing is “wrong,” but laws against 
theft also serve order, property interests, and predictability. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 
108 (“[T]he reason for the overlap between morality and law is that they are parallel me-
thods . . . for bringing about the kind and degree of cooperation that a society needs in 
order to prosper.”). 
 73. Compare Don Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183 (1989)  
(arguing that abortion is “in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human 
being”), with Sidney Buchanan, The Abortion Issue: An Agonizing Clash of Values, 38 
HOUS. L. REV. 1481, 1487 (2002) (arguing that it is morally horrifying to force a pregnant 
woman to carry a fetus against her will). 
 74. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Ronald Dworkin is one of the foremost 
legal proponents that there exists an objectively knowable “right” versus “wrong.” See 
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apply economic sanctions to “inferior” foreign moral codes, they are not 
enacting laws backed by majority vote; they are imposing one conception 
of global truth over another.75 Federalists would argue that this describes 
the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade;76 but when the Court strikes a sta-
tute on review concluding that “what was popular” in a given instance 
“was not ‘right,’” “right” is given a meaning independent of human 
judgment only insofar as it defines a presently prevailing “interpreta-
tion”77 of a social contract78—a contract by which all concerned parties 
had already agreed to be bound.79 
Vegans are not a U.S. majority,80 so the DCPA clearly required support 
from those who eat meat and wear leather (and maybe even those who 
wear other types of fur). One’s opinion on abortion rights may wholly 
depend on one’s moral convictions, but of those who unequivocally  
oppose abortion, few would place conditions on a fetus’s right to life on 
the basis of its ancestry or lineage. Meanwhile, lineage is the lone differ-
ence between wolves (which are hunted in America) and domesticated 
dogs.81 Still, even if a group’s moral code is logically consistent and  
                                                                                                                                     
generally Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 87 (1996). 
 75. In a world where morality is decidedly objective and universal, the “professors 
propose, and the judges impose.” POSNER, supra note 34, at 117. 
 76. In this well-known and divisive case, the Supreme Court held that the right to 
have an abortion is implicitly guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. But as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in 
dissent, “[T]he very existence of the debate is evidence that the ‘right’ to an abortion is 
not [as] universally accepted as the appellant would have us believe.” Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 77. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing that the Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (recognizing that the 
Constitution vests the Supreme Court with the power to strike legislation that is repug-
nant to the Constitution). When a judge decides that a right to abortion does not flow 
from the Constitution, he or she is not ostensibly expressing an independent opinion on 
whether or not humans should have a right to abortion. See generally ARISTOTLE, ON 
INTERPRETATION § 14 (“It is an error to suppose that judgments are to be defined as con-
trary in virtue of the fact that they have contrary subjects.”). 
 78. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 79. The U.S. Constitution can be amended by two-thirds of the federal legislature or 
by three-fourths of state legislatures or conventions. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 80. As of 2006, only an estimated 1.4% of U.S. adults considered themselves  
“vegan.” Charles Stahler, How Many Adults Are Vegetarian?, VEGETARIAN J. (2006), 
http://www.vrg.org/journal/vj2006issue4/vj2006issue4poll.htm. 
 81. “The history of the domestic dog traces back at least 15,000 years, and possibly as 
far back as 100,000 years, to its original domestication from the grey wolf in East Asia.” 
Kerstin Lindblad-Toh et al., Genome Sequence, Comparative Analysis and Haplotype 
Structure of the Domestic Dog, 438 NATURE 803 (2005). 
2009] EXPORTING MORALITY WITH TRADE RESTRICTIONS 1011 
uncontroversial, claims to its objective, universal truth may be no less 
misguided. 
B. Posner and “Pragmatic Moral Skepticism” 
Judge Richard Posner has opined that “many moral claims are just the 
gift wrapping of theoretically ungrounded and ungroundable preferences 
and aversions.”82 This strong assertion came in an attack on what Posner 
terms “academic moralism”—attempts by “ivory tower” professors to 
play a role in “improving the moral judgments” of everyone, from them-
selves and their students to judges, Americans, and foreigners.83 Posner’s 
chief gripe with these “moralists” lies in his claim that, while it is useful 
to study morality, normative proselytizing “has no prospect of improving 
human behavior.”84 “Knowing the moral thing to do furnishes no motive 
. . . for doing it,” he contends.85 
In his book, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Posner  
establishes his own compelling “theory about morality,” which he says 
differs from a “moral theory” in that it does not dictate how humans 
should behave.86 He calls it “Pragmatic Moral Skepticism,” and it com-
prises an amalgam of relativism and pluralism, plus an abundance of 
“skepticism” over the usefulness of moral theorizing in general.87 In 
short, Posner argues that while moral “sentiments” like “pity” and “dis-
gust” may very well be universal, common attempts to craft reasoned 
universal “truths” (e.g., “murder is wrong”) produce mere tautologies 
(i.e., “wrongful killing is wrong”) or abstractions that are too vague to be 
useful (e.g., “don’t lie all the time”).88 Ultimately, Posner asserts that 
moral codes are contingent on locality,89 but he does not go so far as to 
say that these codes should be immune to judgment from outsiders (he 
refers to such a perspective as “vulgar relativism”).90 Rather, Posner 
                                                                                                                                     
 82. POSNER, supra note 34, at 11. 
 83. Id. at 5, 8. 
 84. Id. at 7. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1997) (arguing that moral reasoning should play a role in 
constitutional interpretation). 
 85. POSNER, supra note 34, at 7 (“[M]otive and motivation have to come from outside 
morality. Even if this is wrong, the analytical tools employed in academic moralism—
whether moral casuistry, or reasoning from the canonical texts of moral philosophy, or 
careful analysis, or reflective equilibrium, or some combination of these tools—are too 
feeble to override either narrow self-interest or moral intuitions.”). 
 86. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 1, 12. 
 88. Id. at 6, 19. 
 89. Id. at 6. 
 90. Id. at 8. 
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praises the value of thoughtful moral criticisms but with the important 
caveat that they should be grounded in “functional” (as opposed to nor-
mative) rationales.91 
For instance, Posner speculates that Nazi genocide is so much more 
widely condemned today than “the genocidal policies the United States 
pursued toward the American Indians” because the former was clearly 
not “adaptive to any plausible or widely accepted need or goal” of the 
locality,92 whereas the latter, in functional terms, was “beneficial” in that 
Americans continue benefiting from the seized land today.93 As another 
example, Posner notes that we object to human sacrifice partly because 
we know it “does not avert drought, flooding, famine, earthquakes, or 
other disasters and is thus a poor means to a society’s ends.”94 Posner 
explains: 
[W]hen human sacrificers do not make falsifiable claims for the efficacy 
of the practice, so that the issue becomes a choice of ends rather than a 
choice of means to an agreed end (making the crops grow), our critical 
voice is stilled. Or rather, it becomes a voice expressing disgust—a 
reaction to difference—rather than a voice uttering reasoned criticisms.95 
Posner’s analyses speak to the mentations of the meat-eating animal 
“sympathizers” who supported the DCPA even given the proposition that 
eastern farmers depend on trade in dog and cat pelts for their livelihoods. 
His critique of normative moral theory serves to condemn the cogency 
and usefulness of the “universalist” moral rhetoric that activists as well 
as “academic moralists” rely on in pushing their agendas. 
In 2001, via eight letters published by Slate, Peter Singer engaged in a 
written debate with Posner to challenge his moral skepticism as it relates 
to animal welfare.96 Posner, in turn, challenged Singer’s utilitarianism. In 
a hypothetical, Posner suggested that, if the only way to stop a dog from 
biting a small child is to inflict more pain on the dog than the child 
would suffer from the bite, utilitarian philosophy dictates that the dog 
must be left to bite.97 Singer agreed.98 Posner said that this conclusion 
                                                                                                                                     
 91. Id. at 21. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. See also HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (1980) 
(considering the prevailing image of Christopher Columbus in U.S. history as a “quiet 
acceptance of conquest and murder”). 
 94. POSNER, supra note 34, at 21. 
 95. Id. at 22. 
 96. See Posner & Singer, supra note 52. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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goes against a moral intuition “deeper than any reason that could be given 
for it and impervious to any reason” that could be given against it.99 
Posner agrees with Singer that humans should indeed incur costs to  
reduce the gratuitous suffering of animals.100 But he rejects the use of 
force to coerce humans to incur these costs, especially when the use of 
force is rationalized by one group’s tenuous claim to superior knowledge 
of “moral truth.”101 Posner advocates “persuasion” as the best means of  
improving animal treatment, and he has touted “graphic depictions” like 
those in Singer’s book and on PETA’s website for their ability to inspire 
human empathy for the plight of suffering animals.102 Regarding Ben 
Affleck’s sentimental reply to PETA (and subsequent failure to become a 
vegetarian), Posner might have suggested mailing him additional video 
clips of the slaughter of all his favorite meals. 
Posner would admit that passive persuasion alone will not imminently 
revolutionize the treatment of animals around the world,103 but in weigh-
ing the alternative (the force of law), he would probably first find it 
worth exploring the roots of disparate global views on the scope of ani-
mal rights. “Squeamishness is a big factor in morality,” Posner has  
argued, quoting Hamlet (“[t]he hand of little employment hath the daintier 
sense”).104 “In poor societies most people have seen human corpses and 
have participated in killing, at least of animals. They are inured to blood 
and gore, and so they do not recoil.”105 Meanwhile, Americans are largely 
detached from the process by which food travels from the slaughterhouse 
                                                                                                                                     
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. Law and Philosophy Professor Gary Francione has also rejected the use of 
force as impractical: 
On the social and legal level, there needs to be a paradigm shift as a social matter 
before the legal system will respond in a meaningful way. I disagree with those 
who maintain that the legal system will lead in the struggle for animal rights or 
that significant legal change will occur in the absence of the development of a 
political and social movement in support of animal rights and the abolition of 
animal exploitation. 
Gary L. Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain Without 
Thunder, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 42 (2007). 
 102. See Posner & Singer, supra note 52. While this may sound like a decidedly  
Kantian argument, Posner’s emphasis is that exposure to facts is the best catalyst for 
change. See id. See also infra text accompanying note 103. 
 103. Posner argues that humans already grasp thoroughly that animals feel pain and 
that “to inflict pain without a reason is bad”; thus, it is an altogether different task to  
persuade humans to stop causing animals pain. Id. 
 104. POSNER, supra note 34, at 56. 
 105. Id. 
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to their grocers’ freezers. Posner has gone on to say, “We congratulate 
ourselves on being morally more refined than our predecessors,” when in 
reality, we simply make use of technology to kill from afar.106 
“Science—not moral insight—has made us more civilized (by our 
lights).”107 
These observations serve Posner’s resounding conclusion that “even if 
moral theorizing can provide a usable basis for some moral judgments, it 
should not be used for making legal judgments.”108 Ultimately, Posner 
views law and morality as separate systems of social control with distinct 
and often detached goals (despite the frequent appearance of overlap).109 
He claims that neither system can lay claim to a framework of globally 
universal truth, and he argues that “[i]t is not a scandal when the law fails 
to attach a sanction to immoral conduct or when it attaches a sanction to 
conduct that is not immoral.”110 The grounds for criticism, he maintains, 
reside in the “function” of a given law or moral tenet per its adaptability 
to a “plausible or widely accepted need or goal.”111 
II. THE GATT AND WORLD TRADE IN MORALITY 
A widely accepted goal of many international agreements is the reduc-
tion of encumbrances to free trade, which has been viewed as largely 
adaptable to the goal of enhancing global prosperity.112 In light of short-
term domestic concerns like unemployment and international economic 
power, free trade remains a contentious political issue in the United 
States;113 however, modern economists largely agree that free interna-
tional trade is not only a boon to its voluntary participants, but also an 
                                                                                                                                     
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Moreover, Posner was referring to domestic legal 
judgments which (since they are rendered locally) are even less likely than international 
judgments to contravene the prevailing moral codes of the groups they impact. Id. 
 109. Id. at 110. 
 110. Id. at 108–10 (noting that an involuntary contract breach is punishable but not 
considered “immoral” in the United States, whereas adultery is considered immoral but 
not punishable). 
 111. Id. at 6, 21 (explaining that under an “adaptionist” framework, morality can be 
judged “by its contribution to the survival, or other ultimate goals, of a society,” and that 
this is a nonmoral judgment akin to criticizing a hammer per how “well or poorly 
adapted” it is to “its goal of hammering nails into wood or plaster”). 
 112. See infra text accompanying note 116. 
 113. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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exceptional benefit to the growth of developing economies.114 This latter 
view can be simplified: free-trade leads to the reduction of global pover-
ty.115 Today’s relatively unencumbered “global trading community” was 
born in the wake of World War II when twenty-three nations signed the 
1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in order to liberalize  
international commerce and eradicate “self-defeating mercantilist protec-
tion” among contracting members.116 Originally, the GATT served as a 
platform for countries to negotiate tariff reductions “item-by-item,” and 
with the peer-pressure typical of popular group consensus, the GATT 
developed a strong antiprotectionist spirit that fueled decades of “pro-
trade bias” among contracting members and dispute resolution panels.117 
Today, calls for protectionism have not quite ceased. Domestic Ameri-
can workers, fearful of “outsourcing,” have leveled widespread criticism 
at politicians who support free trade agreements,118 but in the decades 
since the GATT’s inception, sincere protectionism has become some-
thing of a global anachronism, and many of today’s disputed import  
                                                                                                                                     
 114. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 445 (9th ed. 2003) (explaining that international trade is economically desira-
ble). See also infra text accompanying note 116. 
 115. See infra text accompanying note 116. 
 116. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. See also SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND 
SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 1–2 (2003) 
(noting the rationale behind the adoption of the GATT). Under a mercantilist philosophy, 
trade was seen as a zero-sum game. Protectionism was advocated on the premise that a 
nation builds wealth by supplying more exports while demanding fewer imports. This 
theory was first condemned in the eighteenth century by Adam Smith, and then nine-
teenth century economist David Ricardo shattered the premise when he explained the 
theory of “comparative advantage,” which demonstrates how trade can increase value for 
two nations even when one could produce all its own goods. For example, say Portugal 
can produce wine for $1.00 and cloth for $2.00, whereas England can produce wine for 
$3.00 and cloth for $2.00. Portugal and England could produce both goods on their own 
at total costs of $3.00 and $5.00, respectively. But Portugal can produce two bottles of 
wine at $2.00, and England can produce two pieces of cloth at $4.00. When Portugal 
trades wine for English cloth, both nations save $1.00 total. The lesson is that trade can 
be mutually beneficial if nations specialize in goods production for which they hold a 
comparative advantage, even if one is more efficient than the other in every industry. See 
BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 114, at 444 (“[T]rade is a win-win situation.”). 
 117. See CHO, supra note 116, at 2. 
 118. Steelworkers called for protection in 2001 and asked that duties or quotas be im-
posed on foreign-made steel. See Joseph Kahn, Trade Panel Backs Steel Makers, Enabling 
Broad Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at C1. See also Robert E. Reich, The Poor 
Get Poorer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006 (“Most economists and policy makers now accept 
Ricardo’s [comparative advantage] argument, although the popular debate over the merits 
of free trade continues.”). 
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restrictions are premised on other domestic goals that at least appear suf-
ficiently well-intentioned.119 Still, very few “domestic goals” have been 
persuasive enough to warrant international approval when challenged, 
and consistent invocation of the GATT’s “pro-trade bias” has meant that 
“non-trade social concerns, such as human health and environmental pro-
tection, have been treated as mere exceptions to general obligations” and 
have been subject to narrow interpretation under “stringent tests.”120  
Indeed, prior to the formation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
in 1994,121 not one domestic import restriction was deemed justifiable 
under the GATT’s general exceptions provided for in Article XX.122 
Only recently has the GATT’s pro-trade bias seemed to “soften,”123 
though some commentators suggest that this is merely a result of increased 
information costs (which render risks of harm from certain products 
more difficult to detect)124 and shifts among societal norms regarding 
environmental protection.125 This softening is evident in the 1994 Pream-
ble to the WTO Charter, which touts desirable goals (like “sustainable 
development”) that “certainly [go] beyond the narrow anti-protectionist 
motto embedded” in the pre-WTO GATT.126 Additionally, agreements 
born alongside the WTO preemptively tackle the ongoing conflict be-
tween free trade and state regulation; for instance, the 1994 Agreement 
                                                                                                                                     
 119. The measures seem “well-intentioned” in the sense that they do not appear dis-
criminatory toward other nations and are simultaneously defensible as a sovereign na-
tion’s legitimate internal preferences. 
 120. See CHO, supra note 116, at 2–3. Cho also notes that the “textual dichotomy” of 
the agreement has led interpreters to ignore the merits of domestic regulatory goals until 
an initial determination has been made as to whether “general obligations” have been 
violated. Id. This would be the case even if the “domestic regulatory goal” was to prevent 
importation of poisoned food; one could argue that a ban on exporting poisoned food 
should be a “general obligation” and not an afterthought exception to a blanket ban on 
import restrictions. 
 121. The WTO was established in 1994 to serve as a global organization to facilitate 
international trade. As of 2008, it is comprised of 153 member nations. See Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154, 33 I.L.M. 1144. For more information, see WTO, What Is the WTO?, http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2009). 
 122. See CHO, supra note 116, at 3. For discussion of Article XX, see infra Part II.B.2. 
 123. See CHO, supra note 116, at 3. 
 124. Increased information costs are a result of technological advances as well as  
increased specialization that goes hand-in-hand with greater division of labor. Id. See also 
THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 7–8 (1996). See also MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916) (spelling the end of the doctrine of caveat emptor). 
 125. See CHO, supra note 116, at 3 (“More domestic regulations have been issued in 
response to the popular demands of the welfare state.”). 
 126. For instance, it may be easier today to ban imports deemed harmful to the  
environment. Id. at 4. 
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on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures established harmonized scientific 
risk assessment methods that can be employed to objectively justify  
import restrictions based on a product’s risk to health or the environ-
ment.127 
Still, contemporary panel decisions (and commentators’ arguments for 
additional reforms)128 indicate that the GATT and recent derivative WTO 
agreements remain largely and undeniably pro-trade.129 While the GATT 
may be growing more receptive to legitimate domestic regulatory goals, 
there are bright-line rules in place preventing lengthy slides down the 
slippery slope. Restrictions that protect human health or the environment 
can be analyzed empirically; however, there is no truly objective stan-
dard for judging the merits of an invisible, subjective, and unquantifiable 
“harm.” And the GATT is inherently skeptical of such “harms,” lest they 
be embellished as a veiled attempt at protectionism.130 Furthermore, reg-
ulations still must comply with the GATT’s general obligations unless 
they fit squarely within an explicit Article XX exception.131 This section 
argues that, even applying the most favorable casuist interpretations of 
the relevant GATT provisions, the DCPA would not pass muster before a 
dispute resolution panel. 
A. China and the GATT 
Before examining specific GATT provisions, it is necessary to estab-
lish China’s role with respect to the agreement. China was one of the 
original twenty-three parties to sign the GATT in 1948,132 but after a 
revolution splintered the nation in 1949, a new government in Taiwan 
                                                                                                                                     
 127. See id. See also Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1165, 
1165–68 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf. See 
also CHO, supra note 116, at 4. 
 128. See, e.g., Peter Stevenson, The World Trade Organisation Rules: A Legal Analy-
sis of Their Adverse Impact on Animal Welfare, 8 ANIMAL L. 107, 126 (2002) (calling for 
dispute settlement leniency when trade restrictions are enacted in the interest of animals). 
See also CHO, supra note 116 (advocating the loosening of the GATT pro-trade bias to 
make room for more “sustainable development” initiatives). 
 129. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 130. See David Barboza, China Posts a Surplus Sure to Stir U.S. Alarm, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 11, 2006, at C1 (explicating American concerns over trade imbalance with China). 
See also supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 131. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 132. WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry, WTO NEWS, Sep. 
17, 2001, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm [hereinafter China-
WTO]. 
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quickly announced its abandonment of the agreement, and an era of polit-
ical instability left the nation internationally unfastened.133 Today, China is 
composed of two decreasingly adversarial “States”—the People’s  
Republic of China (“PRC”) and the Republic of China (“ROC”)—both 
of which have since regained membership to the GATT, albeit separately 
and not until very recently.134 
The PRC, which was ranked second among world exporters by the 
WTO in 2008,135 is the entity commonly referred to as “China”; it is 
much larger than the ROC and controls most of the nation’s mainland as 
well as Hong Kong and Macau.136 The ROC, on the other hand, (ranked 
sixteenth among exporters) controls only a handful of smaller territories 
and is often referred to as “Chinese Taipei,” Taipei being its capital in 
Taiwan.137 
Even though Hong Kong and Macau are essentially controlled by the 
PRC, they are largely self-governed.138 In fact, before either the PRC or 
ROC regained membership to the GATT, Hong Kong and Macau  
became independent members in 1986 and 1991 respectively, and both 
entities became founding members of the WTO in 1994.139 The PRC 
(under the name “China”) did not accede to the WTO until December 11, 
2001,140 and the ROC (under the name “Chinese Taipei”) not until  
January 1, 2002.141 
Investigators have found that fur farming of dogs and cats is practiced 
primarily in the impoverished northeastern provinces of the PRC like 
                                                                                                                                     
 133. U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, Background Note: China 
(Jan. 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm [hereinafter Background Note: 
China]; U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, Background Note: Tai-
wan (Apr. 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm [hereinafter Background 
Note: Taiwan]; China-WTO, supra note 132. 
 134. WTO: Understanding the WTO—Members, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_ 
e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited May 16, 2009). 
 135. The European Union was ranked first, and the United States was ranked third. 
International Trade Statistics 2008, World Trade Organization 13 (2008). 
 136. Background Note: China, supra note 133. 
 137. Background Note: Taiwan, supra note 133. 
 138. See supra note 133; U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, Back-
ground Note: Macau (Mar. 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7066.htm; U.S. Dep’t 
of State Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, Background Note: Hong Kong (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2747.htm. 
 139. WTO: Understanding the WTO—Members, supra note 134; China-WTO, supra 
note 132. 
 140. WTO: Understanding the WTO—Members, supra note 134. 
 141. Id. 
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Heilongjiang and Shandong.142 One Chinese official within the nation’s 
State Forestry Administration, Zhao Xuemin, proved sympathetic to 
Western animal welfare ideals when he pledged in 2006 to fight for an 
end to what he terms a “barbaric” practice, but Xuemin acknowledged 
the implicit difficulty of such a fight when he noted that fur farming in 
China is fueled by economic hardship.143 If the fur trade combats regional 
poverty, other Chinese officials weighing broader economic concerns 
may recognize much greater incentives to ensure the practice’s survival 
and may even be impelled to challenge foreign trade laws aimed at  
impeding the industry. Though the DCPA was enacted one year prior to 
China’s accession to the WTO, China could now use its membership  
status to file a WTO complaint against the United States over the trade 
restrictive measure. 
B. Interpreting the Relevant GATT Provisions 
When the WTO was established in 1994, its founders designed an  
adjudicatory system through which aggrieved member nations could air 
and settle their disputes.144 Through the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (“DSU”), the founders declared that a delegate could complain to the 
WTO upon belief that his or her nation was the victim of a trade agree-
ment violation,145 and the WTO would then assemble a qualified and  
impartial dispute resolution panel to hear arguments and ultimately issue 
a binding interpretive decision.146 The DSU also established a seven-
person Appellate Body with authority to review and reverse panel deci-
sions if necessary.147 
Before examining the relevant opinions these bodies have handed 
down, an overview of GATT interpretive methodology is instructive. 
                                                                                                                                     
 142. Gary Feuerberg, Dogs and Cats Skinned Alive for Their Fur in China, EPOCH 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://en.epochtimes.com/news/7-2-21/51905.html. 
See also BARBARA MAAS ET AL., FUN FUR?: A REPORT ON THE CHINESE FUR INDUSTRY 3 
(2005). 
 143. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter 
DSU]. For an explanation of GATT dispute settlement procedure prior to the establish-
ment of the WTO, see infra text accompanying note 172. 
 145. See DSU, supra note 144, art. 1. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. art. 17.1–.3. Appellate cases are presided over by any three of the seven justic-
es. The DSU provides that the Appellate Body’s composition is to be “broadly represent-
ative of the membership of the WTO” and free of conflicting interests and other obstacles 
to justice, in order to ensure equitable adjudication. Id. 
1020 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
Article 3.2 of the DSU charges panel members with clarifying the provi-
sions of existing international agreements “in accordance with customary 
rules of interpretation of public international law.”148 The “customary 
rules,” as the Appellate Body explained in its first issued opinion from 
1996, refer to those that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“Vienna Convention”) laid out in 1969.149 The Vienna Convention pro-
vides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their con-
text and in the light of its object and purpose.”150 While this instruction 
remains somewhat vague, it delineates three general interpretive approaches: 
“textual,” “contextual,” and “teleological.”151 Both commentators and 
adjudicators have debated these approaches at length in regard to their 
relative merits, the proper sequence of their application,152 and the extent 
of their interdependence.153 But while a review of this debate may imply 
that certain interpretive approaches garner more favor than others, such 
formalist characterizations as to “favored” or “disfavored” approaches 
may be misleading.154 Panelists are necessarily pragmatic in that, without 
regard to form, they favor objectively verifiable arguments and disfavor 
                                                                                                                                     
 148. See DSU, supra note 144, art. 3.2. 
 149. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.7 WT/DS2/AB (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline]. See also 
LAURA NIELSEN, THE WTO, ANIMALS AND PPMS 198 (2007). 
 150. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 151. See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at 200. 
 152. Compare Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade 
Court,” 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 615–16 (2002), and Appellate Body Report, Japan—
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 12, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/11/AB/R 
(Oct. 4, 1996) (arguing that “textual” interpretation—determined by a dictionary—is the 
best approach, while “telos” should be considered secondarily and “context” lastly), with 
Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.22, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (arguing that the three approaches may be equally valuable 
and, while it is natural to look first to the text and then to its context and purposes, the 
approaches should be applied holistically without regard to order). 
 153. See IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 121 (2d 
ed. 1984) (claiming that the true meaning of a text can only be ascertained by “taking into 
account all the consequences normally and reasonably flowing from that text”). Cf.  
Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 17, 21 (2002) (“The Vienna Convention[,] while including some elements of the 
other methods, is clearly designed as a fundamentally ‘textual’ approach; the text is given 
primacy and is the basic lens through which the ‘intention’ of negotiators is objectively 
discerned.”). 
 154. See Lennard, supra note 153, at 21 (“The Vienna Convention rules emphasize 
that what is being sought is essentially the objectively ascertained intention of the parties 
as manifested in the text of the agreements; the ‘expressed intent’ rather than the ‘subjec-
tive intent,’ of the parties.”). 
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substantively speculative arguments.155 Thus, the persuasiveness of an 
approach will rise and fall case by case per the substance and weight of 
the underlying facts. Still, while textual interpretation per “ordinary 
meaning” may not always be dispositive, it is at least the agreed-upon 
starting point.156 
There are three provisions of the GATT that would be relevant in a 
panel review of the DCPA. The first two are “general obligations” that 
broadly forbid the enactment of trade restrictions.157 The third provision 
lists narrow exceptions that can redeem a regulation if it contravenes one 
of the aforesaid obligations.158 The first obligation, Article XI.1, provides 
that “[n]o prohibitions or restrictions . . . whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of 
the territory of any other contracting party . . . .”159 This provision was 
aimed primarily at “quotas,” but its inclusion of the phrase “other meas-
ures” has rendered it presumptively applicable to blanket import bans as 
well.160 It is additionally significant that this provision was intended to 
apply only to measures enforced directly at a nation’s border.161 
The second “general obligation” provision, Article III.4, requires that 
imported products be “accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin.”162 This provision originally 
targeted “internal” measures—meaning the treatment of imports after 
they pass through customs163—but an interpretive note that was later  
annexed to Article III.4 explained that the provision could be invoked as 
to border-enforced regulations as well.164 This has caused some jurispru-
dential confusion among dispute settlement panels as to which (if not 
both) of the two obligation provisions would be implicated by a regula-
tion like the DCPA.165 
The DCPA need only fail under one obligation to trigger analysis of 
the Article XX exceptions; thus, failure under Article XI.1 would render 
                                                                                                                                     
 155. See id. Empirical evidence is perhaps an international language. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 158. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 159. GATT, supra note 116, art. XI.1. This blanket ban on import prohibitions and 
restrictions is meant to ensure free market access for all member nations. See CHO, supra 
note 116, at 27. 
 160. See CHO, supra note 116, at 27–28. 
 161. See id. at 29. 
 162. GATT, supra note 116, art. III.4. 
 163. See CHO, supra note 116, at 29. 
 164. GATT, supra note 116, Annex A–1. 
 165. See CHO, supra note 116, at 29–33. 
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survival under Article III.4 irrelevant.166 Furthermore, the DCPA’s  
incompatibility with Article XI.1 (a presumptively unyielding blanket 
ban on import restrictions) is conspicuous enough to take for granted.167 
Accordingly, the primary focus of this section will be the DCPA’s  
dubious chance of survival under Article XX; however, there remains a 
chance that a panel could ignore Article XI.1 and analyze the DCPA  
under Article III.4 only.168 This is somewhat unlikely, as will be demon-
strated, but nevertheless, it is necessary to consider Article III.4 at some 
length, and in doing so, the DCPA’s failings with respect to both Articles 
III.4 and XI.1 will be illustrated. 
1. Articles XI.1 and III.4: GATT General Obligations 
The previously disputed U.S. trade restriction most closely analogous 
to the DCPA was a 1991 amendment to the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act (“MMPA”) that prohibited the importation of yellowfin tuna cap-
tured using a fishing practice often fatal to dolphins.169 In the eastern 
tropical Pacific Ocean, tuna swim directly below dolphins, and when 
fishermen use dolphins to locate tuna, their nets have been liable to inad-
vertently trap and kill the dolphins as well.170 After the United States  
rejected its tuna imports in 1991 as dolphin-deadly, Mexico requested a 
panel hearing to examine whether the MMPA prohibition violated  
Articles XI and III.171 
A panel was assembled and a decision was rendered in this dispute in 
1991 (“Tuna-Dolphin I”) declaring that the MMPA amendment violated 
Article XI.1 of the GATT.172 The panel deemed the U.S. import prohibi-
                                                                                                                                     
 166. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 167. See CHO, supra note 116, at 27 (“The inflexible quality of the article has naturally 
resulted in jurisprudential treatment in which the mere existence of a trade restriction 
itself would suffice to find a violation of the Article.”). 
 168. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 169. See Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R 
(Aug. 16, 1991) GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna–Dolphin I]. 
 170. Id. ¶¶ 2.1–.2. 
 171. Id. ¶ 1. 
 172. Id. It is important to note that this decision was not officially adopted into GATT 
jurisprudence. While dispute resolution proceeded identically (by panel formation) under 
the GATT prior to the existence of the DSU, panel decisions were formerly not deemed 
binding unless adopted by a consensus of all GATT members. For the specifics of the 
pre-WTO dispute resolution procedure, see GATT, supra note 116, art. XXIII. When the 
panel issued its opinion in Tuna-Dolphin I, U.S. and Mexican representatives entered into 
negotiations and agreed that Mexico would not seek adoption of the decision in exchange 
for a U.S. commitment to redesign its legislation. See Paul J. Yechout, In the Wake of 
Tuna II: New Possibilities for GATT-Compliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 247, 259 (1996). The result was a 1992 amendment to the MMPA known 
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tion facially inconsistent with Article XI’s general obligation of free 
market access, and further explained that this finding rendered considera-
tion of Article III unnecessary.173 Most notably, however, the panel chose 
to explain in dicta that the measure would have been inconsistent with 
Article III nonetheless.174 Focusing on tuna solely as a “product,” the 
panel concluded that the exported end result—edible tuna—was the same 
regardless of how the fish was captured.175 “A determination of ‘like-
ness’ under Article III.4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the  
nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among prod-
ucts,” panelists have explained.176 Emphasis is to be placed on the extent 
to which, according to a consumer, the product is objectively substituta-
ble.177 
Of course, one would argue that consumers do not find dog fur substi-
tutable for fox fur. However, this claim is somewhat undermined given 
that consumers have been satisfied with dog fur purchases so long as 
they have remained ignorant.178 Consumers acquired dog fur indiscrimi-
                                                                                                                                     
as the International Dolphin Conservation Act, which lifted the import ban with respect to 
any nation that would agree to a five-year moratorium on the controversial practice. See 
id. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1411 (1994). This outcome demonstrates that some nations are 
amenable to compromise despite another’s (admitted) violation of the GATT. See  
Yechout, supra, at 172. But one might justifiably raise concerns about the outcome given 
disparate economic bargaining power between the United States and Mexico. U.S. con-
tract law polices such disparities carefully when judges consider whether contracts should 
be deemed voidable for lack of consideration or unconscionable as against public policy. 
See generally ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 188 (8th ed. 2001) (discussing 
unconscionable bargains); id. at 221–23 (discussing mutuality of obligation). See also 
Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L. L. 689, 733 
(1998) (“[A]symmetry of market power . . . give[s] larger countries more coercive pow-
er.”). To this point, one may ask whether American policy makers thoroughly imagine all 
potential implications of trade bans; if politicians consider illegal immigration a pressing 
problem in the United States, they might consider that import bans can make it even more 
difficult for citizens in poorer nations to earn wages. But the more pressing point here is 
that, though not adopted, the panel decision rendered in the Tuna-Dolphin I dispute has 
nonetheless been deemed probative and indicative of how qualified panelists may address 
similar issues. Id. at 723. 
 173. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 169, ¶¶ 5.14–.18. 
 174. Id. ¶¶ 5.14–.15. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbes-
tos and Asbestos Containing Products, ¶ 99 WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Asbestos AB]. 
 177. Distinguishing a product harmful to consumers (e.g., a product containing Asbes-
tos) from dolphin-deadly tuna is instructive; objectively verifiable harmfulness renders 
the former not substitutable. See id. ¶ 145. 
 178. See Recall, supra note 2 (discussing the deception of retailers). 
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nately and would have continued to do so had the Humane Society never 
released its findings.179 In fact, consumers may continue to do so today if 
DCPA enforcement is ineffectual.180 Consumers may disapprove of the 
practices that brought them their edible tuna and wearable coats, but  
panelists have explained that Article III.4 calls for a comparison of  
imported and domestic products without regard to the “practices, policies 
and methods” of their production within the exporting nation.181 This 
principle is justifiable in that international traders usually depend to an 
extent on the stability and predictability of ongoing relationships.182  
Responding rationally to market demand, exporters may make substan-
tial investments in product production, believing (perhaps quite justifia-
bly) that their demand is not liable to instantaneously and arbitrarily  
evaporate.183 A fur farmer in China may view dogs and foxes as identical 
wild beasts, all the more identical when their furs are dyed and processed 
to adorn garments. This level of abstraction may be difficult for Ameri-
cans to swallow, but it renders tenable the argument that the DCPA causes 
“fur” produced and sold domestically to be given more “favourable” 
treatment than “fur” imported from China. 
Granted, one may cry foul on the grounds that, if “all fur” is the same, 
then “all jewelry” is the same, and cubic zirconium is thus substitutable 
for diamond. But this rebuttal is misdirected. When different products are 
deceptively identical, the prime rationales for protecting consumers  
relate to real difference in function, pecuniary value, or risk.184 Norma-
tive arguments become decreasingly persuasive the more two products 
can be seen as having a comprehensibly substitutable function, given that 
“function” can include considerations of value and risk.185 In other 
                                                                                                                                     
 179. This speculation may best be supported in that not one consumer complained after 
purchasing dog fur prior to the Humane Society report, see id., and it remains activists 
and not consumers uncovering the continued prevalence of dog and cat fur sold in U.S. 
stores. See supra notes 7–10. 
 180. See supra notes 7–10. 
 181. A second dispute over the U.S. dolphin-deadly tuna import ban arose in 1994 
when the European Communities complained to the GATT; the panel then reaffirmed its 
previous conclusions about Article III.4. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.9, DS29/R (Jun. 16, 1994). 
 182. See CHO, supra note 116, at 27 (citing Report of the Panel, Japan—Measures on 
Imports of Leather, L/5623 (Mar. 2, 1984) GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 113, ¶ 55 (1984). 
 183. Id. 
 184. These bases are self-evident under the contract law theory of “expectation damag-
es,” which attempt to give the plaintiff the “benefit of the bargain” he or she had entered, 
meaning, to put him or her in the position he or she would have been in if the defendant 
performed in accordance with the agreement. See generally CORBIN, supra note 172. 
 185. In other words, the function of a diamond is to have a certain value, and the func-
tion of dog food is to feed a dog without causing the dog harm or undue risk of harm. 
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words: are generic pants made in China “like” Armani pants? Under  
Article III.4, the answer is yes. Otherwise, either could be arbitrarily 
banned from the United States. 
Dr. Laura Nielson, author of The WTO, Animals and PPMs,186 has 
noted that a dispute comparing the fur of endangered animals to that of 
nonendangered animals may be much more likely to survive Article 
III.4.187 The two products could be deemed distinct in that one poses  
potential harm by depleting a resource.188 This is a fair argument, but it is 
more aptly invoked as a justification under the Article XX(g) exception 
for resource conservation.189 And such a justification would be invoked 
after a regulation’s failure under Articles XI or III.190 As such, this hypo-
thetical may be most illustrative of the pro-trade bias inherent to the 
GATT general obligations191 and may also be viewed as a rationale for 
that bias, given that there is a separate GATT provision—Article XX—
for raising claims that clearly have little to do with the functional substi-
tutability of products.192 Nielsen concluded that it remains unclear 
whether the fur of endangered animals is “like” that of nonendangered 
animals for the purposes of Article III.4.193 This coincidentally implies 
that Nielson would find the existing jurisprudence at least equally  
unclear on whether the fur of nonendangered dogs is “like” the fur of 
nonendangered foxes.194 Still, speculation may be unnecessary. Article 
III.4 ambiguities have invited substantial debate, but the provision may 
not prove significant in a DCPA challenge.195 
                                                                                                                                     
What is the function of a carpet? See Vista St. Clair, Inc. v. Landry’s Comm. Furnishings, 
Inc., 57 Or. App. 254 (1982) (refusing to deem that a defective discolored carpet was 
worth zero dollars because plaintiff made “use” of the carpet nonetheless). 
 186. “PPMs” refers to Nielsen’s consideration of trade restrictions that are based on 
“Product or Production Method.” See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at xxii. 
 187. Id. at 151. 
 188. Id. (analogizing the panel’s reasoning in the Asbestos dispute). 
 189. Article XX(g) provides an exception for trade restrictions “relating to the conser-
vation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption . . . .” See GATT, supra note 
116, art. XX(g). See also CHO, supra note 116, at 32–33. 
 190. See CHO, supra note 116, at 32. 
 191. See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at 151 (stressing specifically the broad coverage of 
Article XI). 
 192. See CHO, supra note 116, at 32 (reasoning that defendants are most likely to focus 
solely on Article XX once an import ban is found to violate either of the two obligations). 
 193. See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at 151. 
 194. See id. 
 195. Article III.4 would only come into play if a panel reversed course drastically and 
determined that Article XI does not apply to “other measures.” See supra note 159 and 
accompanying text; infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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The most recent panel decision in which a complainant challenged a 
trade restriction under both Articles XI and III was the Asbestos dis-
pute.196 France had banned the importation of products containing Asbes-
tos,197 and when Canada complained to the WTO, a panel determined, 
first, that the regulation was most properly subject to Article III.4; 
second, that the regulation violated Article III.4; third, that the regulation 
was nonetheless redeemable under Article XX; and fourth, that Article 
XI therefore did not require consideration.198 From the panel’s methodol-
ogy in this decision, it has since been inferred that regulatory measures 
imposed on both domestic production and importation (i.e., measures 
like the asbestos ban and the DCPA)199 are only subject to analysis under 
Article III.4 (and not Article XI.1).200 This is a desirable reading for  
defendant nations given that Article XI.1 would facially invalidate any 
import ban barring an Article XX exception,201 but there are a number of 
reasons that this inference is flawed.202 Dr. Nielsen has recognized, most 
blatantly, that the inapplicability of Article XI.1 to total203 bans would 
                                                                                                                                     
 196. See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sep. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Asbestos]. 
 197. See id. ¶ 8.1. 
 198. See id. ¶¶ 8.99, 8.241. 
 199. The DCPA also bans domestic manufacture and trade in dog and cat fur. See su-
pra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 200. See CHO, supra note 116, at 33 (“[I]t can be said that the decision in Asbestos 
constitutes the authoritative case law on this point.”). Moreover, this is one basis on 
which the United States would disclaim invalidity of the DCPA. See Findings, supra note 
4 (“The imposition of a ban on the sale, manufacture, offer for sale, transportation, and 
distribution of dog and cat fur products, regardless of their source, is consistent with the 
international obligations of the United States because it applies equally to domestic and 
foreign producers . . . .”). 
 201. See CHO, supra note 116, at 27–28 (noting that the inclusion of the phrase “other 
measures” in the text of Article XI.1 has been interpreted broadly in accordance with the 
GATT pro-trade bias). 
 202. For instance, the panel admitted it was unclear on whether Canada was even 
claiming that Articles XI.1 and III.4 should be analyzed collectively given that Canada 
failed to follow a procedural guideline for making alternative allegations. See Asbestos, 
supra note 196, ¶ 8.100. Furthermore, in its opinion considering Canada’s appeal of the 
panel’s Article XX ruling, the Appellate Body couched the panel’s neglect of Article XI 
as a mere matter of “judicial economy.” Asbestos AB, supra note 176, ¶ 5 (“Having found 
that the [Asbestos ban] is subject to, and inconsistent with, the obligations set forth in 
Article III.4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel did not deem it necessary to examine the 
claims of Canada under Article XI of the GATT 1994.”) (emphasis added). Most notably, 
a pure textual analysis of Article XI renders it unequivocally applicable to all restrictions. 
See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at 151; supra note 201 and accompanying text. See also 
GATT, supra note 116, art. XI.1. 
 203. “Total,” meaning bans applicable to foreign and interstate commerce. 
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render the existence of certain Article XX exceptions redundant or irre-
levant.204 For instance, Article XX(a) provides an exception for morality-
based trade restrictions,205 and such restrictions must necessarily be  
imposed on domestic as well as imported products lest the moral premise 
be immediately contradicted.206 Thus, if Article XI.1 were to apply only 
to discriminatory measures,207 the moral exception would have no reason 
to exist.208 
Furthermore, Article III.4 was originally applied, for instance, in dis-
putes over “dual retail systems” through which imported and domestic 
products received unequal distribution or other forms of unfair internal 
treatment.209 While the 1994 note to Article III has indeed caused juri-
sprudential confusion,210 the Asbestos panel report may have maligned 
the distinctions between Article XI.1 and Article III.4. The note provides, 
in relevant part, that “[a]ny internal tax or other internal charge, or any 
law, regulation or requirement . . . collected or enforced . . . at the time or 
point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or 
other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement . . . .” The 
note’s text evinces a clear intention to secure a loophole—to ensure that 
internal discriminatory preferences cannot skirt Article III.4 analysis on 
the basis that they were imposed at the border and were thus not inter-
nal.211 More so than the existence of Article XX(a) presupposes a reason 
for its existence, the definitive purpose behind the note to Article III.4212 
(compared with the separate and distinct purpose behind Article XI.1)213 
implies that the two provisions have no reason to overlap redundantly. 
In sum, the DCPA should fail under Article III.4’s “like product”  
inquiry if subjected to it, but, like the MMPA amendment in Tuna-
                                                                                                                                     
 204. See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at 152. 
 205. See GATT, supra note 116, art. XX(a). See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 206. In other words, it would be difficult (i.e., blatantly hypocritical) to argue that a 
product cannot be imported for moral reasons if the product were not also prohibited 
from interstate commerce. See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at 152. 
 207. “Discriminatory,” meaning measures that ban one nation’s product without  
banning the same product from other nations or domestically. 
 208. See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at 152. 
 209. See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶¶ 130–51, WT/DS161/AB/R (Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter  
Korea-Beef]. 
 210. See CHO, supra note 116, at 29–33. 
 211. See id. at 30 (citing GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, ANALYTICAL 
INDEX—GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 136 (1994)). 
 212. The note to Article III.4’s purpose is to secure the loophole so that Article III.4 is 
certain to apply to all internal measures (to prevent internal discrimination). 
 213. Article XI.1’s purpose is to prevent external discrimination. 
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Dolphin I, the DCPA should most probably be analyzed under Article 
XI.1, in which case it would be presumptively invalidated barring the 
Article XX exception. Still, even if the DCPA were to be tested under 
Article III.4 (and were to survive), there are strong textual, contextual, 
and teleological arguments to be made for subsequent invalidation under 
Article XI.1.214 It follows that the United States should focus more on the 
persuasiveness of its Article XX affirmative defenses than on arguments 
directly relating to either general obligation provision.215 
2. Article XX: “Exceptions” to the GATT General Obligations 
In an article published in the journal Animal Law, British animal wel-
fare activist Peter Stevenson argues that, in enacting laws like the 
MMPA and DCPA, countries are not attempting to “force other countries 
to change their standards”; they are simply seeking the “liberty to prohibit 
within their own territory the marketing of products (whether domesti-
cally produced or imported) derived from practices which involve animal 
suffering.”216 Touting the preamble to the DCPA, which states that U.S. 
consumers have a right to “ensure that they are not unwitting participants 
in [a] gruesome trade,”217 Stevenson has congratulated the United States 
for embracing the argument that “a country should be able to act as an 
ethical consumer.”218 Stevenson’s sentiment is widely shared219 and, at 
first glance, it even appears compatible with the text of the GATT. As 
mentioned above, Article XX sets out a limited number of exceptions to 
the agreement’s general member obligations, including an exception for 
“morality.”220 The Article XX provisions relevant to the DCPA are as 
follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a  
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
                                                                                                                                     
 214. See NIELSEN, supra note 149, at 151–52. 
 215. See CHO, supra note 116, at 32 (“Once an import ban is found to violate either 
provision, the defendants are most likely to rely on Article XX . . . in arguing that the 
measure in question is a justified exception under either provision”). See, e.g., Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp] (illustrating a dispute in which 
the United States admitted a probable violation under Article XI.1 and moved straight to 
affirmative defenses). 
 216. Stevenson, supra note 128, at 126. 
 217. See Findings, supra note 4. 
 218. Stevenson, supra note 128, at 126. 
 219. This is self-evident given the enactment of the DCPA by a U.S. legislative  
majority. 
 220. See GATT, supra note 116, art. XX. 
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a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any  
contracting party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . .221 
Looking first at the exception under Article XX(b), one may imme-
diately assume that “animal life or health” is a surprisingly explicit road-
block to a DCPA challenge. This appearance is deceiving. A regulation 
examined under Article XX must pass a multipart test; not only must its 
aim be provided for explicitly (for example, “animal protection”), but the 
panel must deem the method by which it would be achieved “necessary” 
and find it to be in accordance with the requirements of the Article XX 
headnote.222 While the latter two prongs of this test will prove difficult 
for the DCPA, the first prong will be surprisingly problematic as well. 
Though the DCPA was tailored directly to the text of Article XX(b),223 it 
is almost certain to fail on an unobvious threshold inquiry. 
Before asking the “necessity” question (which primarily considers 
whether there is a way to accomplish the domestic regulatory goal at  
issue in a manner less restrictive of trade), a panel will illuminate an  
Article XX textual ambiguity. The United States may claim the DCPA is 
necessary to protect animal life or health, but in what nation?224 This  
issue arose in Tuna-Dolphin I when the United States argued that Article 
XX(b) allowed for U.S. laws that protect the lives of Mexican dol-
phins.225 The panel firmly rejected this proposition on the basis that  
Article XX(b) refers to protection of domestic animals only.226 Thus, only 
if Mexican tuna-fishing threatened dolphins located within U.S. territory 
would the ban have been justifiable.227 The DCPA suffers the same flaw 
in its attempt to save dogs not located within U.S. jurisdiction. A number 
of commentators, including Steve Charnovitz, former Director of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 221. Id. Article XX provides for additional exceptions, but they are not relevant to an 
examination of the DCPA’s validity. 
 222. This test was prescribed in the first panel opinion under the newly established 
WTO DSU. See Gasoline, supra note 149, at 296. 
 223. Findings, supra note 4 (“Such a ban is also consistent with provisions of interna-
tional agreements to which the United States is a party that expressly allow for measures 
designed to protect the health and welfare of animals.”). 
 224. The DCPA is an admitted attempt to protect “health and welfare of animals” in 
foreign nations. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Tuna–Dolphin I, supra note 169, ¶¶ 5.25–.28. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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Yale Global Environment and Trade Study,228 have stood behind the  
Tuna-Dolphin I panel’s assertion that Article XX(b) cannot be invoked to 
protect life or health “extrajurisdictionally.”229 The primary rationales for 
this argument invoke debate over economic coercion230 and sovereign-
ty231—considerations that are identically relevant when examining the 
DCPA under Article XX(a).232 
The DCPA’s survival of the necessity test under both Articles XX(b) 
and XX(a) hinges on a determination that the United States can justifiably 
coerce behavior in a foreign nation. Presumably, a majority of American 
citizens do not want dog or cat fur to be imported into the country.233 To 
realize this goal, they have chosen to burden suppliers of dog fur234—
Chinese fur exporters. Whether the rationale of this goal is a XX(b) aim 
to save animal lives in China,235 a XX(a) aim to protect the sensibilities 
of unwitting American fur consumers,236 or a XX(a) aim to coercively 
export U.S. morality to China,237 all would be better served if the burden 
was placed not on foreigners but directly on American importers and  
retailers. This is why the DCPA would probably fail the “necessity” test 
under either XX(a) or XX(b).238 
If Congress required fur distributors and retailers to test the fur they 
import, American consumers could retain the choice of purchasing dog 
                                                                                                                                     
 228. For more information on the Yale Global Environment and Trade Study, which 
employed experts who sought to reconcile environmental protection with trade liberaliza-
tion, see http://envirocenter.research.yale.edu/programs/completed-projects (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2008). 
 229. See Charnovitz, supra note 172, at 731 (calling efforts to prescribe behavior in 
foreign countries paternalistic). 
 230. Id. at 733. 
 231. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 232. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 233. Again, this is self-evident per enactment of the DCPA by a legislative majority. 
 234. See DCPA, 19 U.S.C § 1308. See also supra text accompanying note 4. 
 235. See GATT, supra note 116, art. XX(b) (“necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health”). 
 236. See GATT, supra note 116, art. XX(a) (“necessary to protect public morals”). 
 237. Id. 
 238. In a 2000 decision, the Appellate Body defined the “necessity” text via textual 
interpretation, determining that the word “necessary” can mean, at one extreme, “indis-
pensible” to a goal, and on the other end, merely “making a contribution to” a goal. The 
Appellate Body concluded that, for the purposes of Article XX jurisprudence, “neces-
sary” lies closer to “indispensible.” See Korea-Beef, supra note 209, ¶¶ 159–60. In a 
2005 dispute, the Appellate Body ruled that a complaining party can raise a specific less-
restrictive alternative, and the defendant then has to prove that its present measure remains 
necessary in light of the alternative. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R 
(Apr. 7, 2005). 
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and cat, and if they so chose, they would do so knowingly and purpose-
fully.239 If American distaste for dog and cat fur were genuine, consumer 
demand would diminish authentically and, U.S. garment importers would 
begin shunning dog and cat fur exporters just as they would shun expor-
ters of outdated fashion.240 Soon enough, those exporters would start 
shunning dog and cat fur themselves. This alternative is not only less 
restrictive of trade but also more adaptive to genuine achievement of the 
underlying goal (regardless of the goal’s exact rationale).241 If this option 
was not pursued by Congress in 2000 because it would have imposed 
costs on American business instead of foreign business, then the DCPA 
could fail under the Article XX headnote prohibition of “disguised” pro-
tection or “unjustifiable discrimination.”242 Regardless, the existence of 
such an alternative suggests that the DCPA’s necessity is highly ques-
tionable, and the necessity test would not even be implicated should a 
                                                                                                                                     
 239. Invalidating a cigarette import ban enacted by Thailand in 1990, a panel ruled that 
strict labeling and ingredient disclosure requirements would have been a preferable, less-
restrictive alternative. See Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of 
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990) GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 
200, ¶¶ 75–81 (1990). A panel’s preference for such an alternative may evince a  
preference for choice versus force (i.e., informed individual decision making versus 
forced collective decision making), or it may simply be that market decisions made by 
fully informed consumers to avoid a product are almost always a less trade-restrictive 
alternative to achieving the same goal of a forced ban. This may even hold true for illegal 
drugs, as, for instance, while U.S. citizens are free to drink as much alcohol as they so 
choose, only a small percentage actually become alcoholics. 
 240. The United States seemingly keeps bell-bottoms off retailer shelves today without 
use of import bans. 
 241. Of course, the goal of “exporting morality” would be achieved superficially, but 
there is no reason to think Chinese attitudes toward cats and dogs (and ingrained beliefs 
about animals and animal welfare in general) would change; any changes in animal 
treatment would merely represent a response to change in U.S. consumer preferences. 
 242. Given publicized U.S. concerns over growing trade imbalance with China, see 
supra note 130 and accompanying text, it is easy to imagine a disguised protectionist 
motive behind the DCPA. But more practically, one could accuse the United States of 
engaging in arbitrary discrimination against eastern nations—arbitrary because the DCPA 
does not ban all fur, it only bans fur likely to come from nations with subjectively  
different norms and socioeconomic conditions. Consider this statement from the panel in 
U.S.-Shrimp: 
[I]t is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to 
use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially the 
same comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as 
that in force within that Member’s territory, without taking into consideration 
different conditions which may occur in the territories of those other Members. 
U.S- Shrimp, supra note 215, ¶¶ 163–64. 
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panel immediately invalidate the DCPA as an “extrajurisdictional” over-
reach.243 
For the DCPA to survive as a GATT exception, a panel would need to 
take a tenuous stand on the nature of sovereignty.244 In his article “Moral 
Exception in Trade Policy,” Charnovitz acknowledges economist Richard 
N. Cooper’s contention that “the international community cannot, and 
should not be able to, force a country to purchase products, the produc-
tion of which offends the sensibilities of its citizenry.”245 This is basically 
the same argument made by Stevenson, excerpted above.246 Though 
Charnovitz does not raise a direct objection, this reasoning is arguably 
disingenuous if one examines what it means to “force a country” to pur-
chase products. The United States government is not the “purchaser” of 
fur. Fur is only imported into the United States because U.S. consumers 
value it enough to create demand. Cooper imagines a citizenry that is 
somehow forced to demand what it finds offensive.247 This argument 
holds water if the product is addictive or otherwise manipulative of  
consumer preference, but in the case of dog fur, his argument becomes 
circular. A citizen offended by an utterly nonessential product will never 
be “forced” to purchase it unless he or she inadvertently confuses it with 
a less offensive substitute.248 If he or she does confuse it, either the prod-
                                                                                                                                     
 243. See Tuna–Dolphin I, supra note 169, ¶¶ 5.25–.28 
 244. One would have to implicitly recognize a U.S. stake (and thus, a “say”) in the 
treatment of animals in a foreign country, and this is a repudiation of the very notion of 
state sovereignty. Article 3 of the U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Social Progress 
and Development sets out a list of conditions necessary for the social progress and devel-
opment of a nation, including the 
  . . . [p]ermanent sovereignty of each nation over its natural wealth and  
resources; 
  . . . The right and responsibility of each State and, as far as they are  
concerned, each nation and people[,] to determine freely its own objectives of 
social development, to set its own objectives of social development, to set its 
own priorities and to decide in conformity with the principle of the Charter of 
the United Nations the means and methods of their achievement without external 
interference . . . . 
Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542 (XXIV), art. 3(d)–(e), 
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (Dec. 11, 1969). 
 245. See Charnovitz, supra note 172, at 732 (citing RICHARD N. COOPER, ENVIRONMENT 
AND RESOURCE POLICIES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 30 (1994)). 
 246. See Stevenson, supra note 128, at 126. 
 247. See Charnovitz, supra note 172, at 732. 
 248. This point rebuts any possible comparisons between a fur market and a human 
organ market. Professor Margaret Jane Radin argues that a market for organs would leave 
the poor helplessly induced to sell (while the dying would be forced to buy). See 
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ucts are so indistinguishable (and the distinction so benign) that the subs-
titution is all but irrelevant, or the products are distinguishable. In the 
latter case, if the distinction is still benign,249 demanders are probably the 
“cheapest cost avoiders”250 (as opposed to suppliers) when it comes to 
preventing the mix-up, especially if prevention is desirable solely out of 
moral contempt. Cooper’s reasoning is inapplicable when disgust is all 
that is at stake; in such instances, force need not be imposed on suppliers 
or demanders; desired outcomes will be achieved by market action or 
will otherwise be exposed as too superficial to matter.251 As will be  
argued below, the type of force imposed by the DCPA is not only unneces-
sary but also ineffective and potentially counterproductive.252 Further-
more, these same implications undergird the teleological argument that 
the GATT should be interpreted to err on the side of trade.253 Indeed, the 
DCPA faces yet another obstacle in light of the objectively verifiable 
(and justifiable)254 teleological impetus for narrow interpretation of Article 
XX exceptions under “stringent tests.”255 
                                                                                                                                     
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, 
CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (1996). However, since no human will ever 
depend on fur as a life necessity, it would be disingenuous to characterize purchasers of a 
certain type of fur as “helplessly induced.” 
 249. “Benign” is used in the sense that “moral outrage” is the only imaginable conse-
quence of inadvertent substitution. Granted, the implication is not that dogs are “substi-
tutable” for foxes, rabbits, or coyotes; but it is noteworthy that American shoppers will 
think this the case if they are not told otherwise. Moreover, it is noteworthy that if not for 
the extensive Humane Society undercover investigation overseas, it is possible that not 
one consumer, consumer protection advocate, investigative journalist, American fur  
importer, or retailer would have made the discovery. 
 250. According to Guido Calabresi, one who can prevent harm at the least expense 
should be charged with doing so. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSI-
BILITIES AND REDRESS 129–30 (2004). 
 251. If enough consumers—at least enough to sustain a fur market—would buy fur 
given some unknowable probability that it came from a dog or cat, this behavior would 
perhaps demonstrate a moral calculation explicitly contradictory to the legislatively pro-
fessed (majority) desire to keep dog fur out of the country. In other words, consider that 
all consumers buying fur coats assume a fifty-percent chance that they will be buying 
dog. Then consider that all consumers buying fur coats assume wearing fur has a fifty-
percent chance of causing cancer. Consumers will either largely continue buying, meaning 
the force of law is not warranted (because it is incompatible with majority preference), or 
they will cease buying the product, meaning the force of law is not necessary. 
 252. See discussion infra Part III. 
 253. The GATT was established on the principle that all voluntary transactions are 
(logically) of mutual benefit (or they would not occur). See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra 
note 114, at 444; Cho, supra note 116, at 2. 
 254. “Justifiable” because the GATT is not an objective list of rules, it is an “agree-
ment”; thus, its text may not always explicate its object and purpose, let alone the express 
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Though much has been written about the GATT Article XX(a) morality 
exception, not one morality-based import ban has ever been directly 
challenged by a member nation.256 The reason for this is unclear, but 
Charnovitz puts forth a plausible explanation regarding political consid-
erations.257 When the European Commission, for instance, banned the 
importation of fur from animals captured with leg traps, the United States 
(as a nation that used leg traps) threatened a WTO challenge. The United 
States and the European Commission settled the disagreement without 
WTO intervention, however,258 and Charnovitz speculates that “although 
the U.S. government probably felt confident that it could win on legal 
grounds in Geneva, it knew that it would lose political ground in Wash-
ington if the animal welfare groups joined the anti-WTO coalition.”259 
If China were to challenge the United States over the DCPA, Western-
ers naive to GATT nuance would probably be as outraged as they were 
in the wake of the 1998 dog-fur scandal.260 China may be avoiding the 
issue for fear of the publicity, but it is also possible that, within the  
nation, the power to initiate the complaint does not lie in the same hands 
as the interest to do so. Or perhaps those most familiar with the economic 
impact of the DCPA are not also intimately familiar with the nature of 
China’s membership rights under the DSU and the GATT. Most likely, 
however, Chinese officials possess the requisite information but believe 
that the cost of the DCPA to poverty-stricken Chinese citizens, though 
significant, does not outweigh the nonpecuniary cost of a publicized pro-
test.261 If this is the case, the United States has successfully perpetrated 
economic punishment262 with little more justification than that offered by 
                                                                                                                                     
intentions of those who voluntarily agreed to be bound by it. See Lennard, supra note 
153, at 21. 
 255. See id. See also Cho, supra note 116, at 2–3. 
 256. See Charnovitz, supra note 172, at 731. 
 257. See id. at 740. 
 258. See id. at 736–40. 
 259. Id. at 740. 
 260. See Recall, supra note 2. 
 261. If China challenged the DCPA, some Americans may merely increase calls for 
economic sanctions or greater restrictions on importation of Chinese products. See, e.g., 
Martin Tolchin, House, Breaking with Bush, Votes China Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, June 
30, 1989 (reporting that Congress voted unanimously to impose economic sanctions on 
China upon learning of increasing human rights violations within the nation). 
 262. In 2000, just months before the DCPA was enacted, Cass Sunstein illuminated the 
economic implications of the ban: 
[A ban on the importation of dog fur] places certain companies that are pre-
pared to sacrifice the well-being of animals at a competitive disadvantage, by 
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the Fur Information Council of America as to its objection to the sale of 
dog fur in the United States: “It’s just not something we want to see hap-
pening.”263 
III. PRAGMATIC ACTIVISM CAN BE CONTROVERSIAL TOO 
While the DCPA would probably fail a doctrinal challenge under the 
GATT, there are additional reasons to conclude that morality-based trade 
restrictions are contrary to domestic and international policy goals. Thus 
far, it has been argued that unencumbered international trade serves  
mutuality of economic prosperity264 and that morality is “a product of the 
exigencies of life in a given society.”265 From these premises, there is 
considerable support for the contrarian argument that purchasing an  
abundance of dog fur imports from impoverished foreigners is actually 
the most advisable and realistic approach toward the DCPA’s purported 
goals of aligning foreign moral codes with prevailing U.S. norms and 
improving future animal treatment globally (i.e., reducing future dog and 
cat fur imports). This is a significantly speculative claim, but it is perhaps 
easier to support than its polar opposite—a call for additional restrictions 
and improved enforcement of the DCPA. The latter proposal is as 
wrongheaded as it is popular among activists at present, and this section 
will examine its practical (and theoretical) flaws, arguing first, that free 
trade is the best path to “improving” global morals, and second, that trade 
restrictions are no better at keeping dog and cat fur off U.S. shelves than 
they are at keeping cocaine out of the hands of millions of Americans.266 
                                                                                                                                     
forbidding those companies from engaging in practices that would help them in 
the marketplace. 
  . . . . 
  . . . [This] would plainly help companies that sell ordinary or synthetic fur 
coats, because such companies would face less competition. The existing cases 
on competitor standing suggest that [ordinary or synthetic fur coat] companies 
would be fully entitled to sue to produce legally required enforcement action. 
Or suppose that a statute designed to protect animal welfare is obeyed by some 
commercial actors but not by others; suppose too that compliance is costly and 
hence those who disobey the statute are at a competitive advantage (as is highly 
likely). 
Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1346. 
 263. Supra note 70. 
 264. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 265. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 266. See Not Winning the War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2008, at A18 (“While 
seizures are up, so are shipments.”). 
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A. Free Trade “Improves” Morals 
Judge Posner would argue that when A seeks to “improve” the morals 
of C, this just means A would like C’s morals to become more like 
hers.267 Still, Posner would point out that this does not immediately repu-
diate A’s mission. A may seek to persuade C that adopting a different 
moral code would be more adaptive to C’s goals or needs, and if A were 
right, C would be foolish to ignore the advice. For instance, say C lives 
on a farm, and economic conditions in his country render his income too 
meager to afford him the most basic necessities his family requires for 
survival. C’s wife, son, and daughter subsist on very little, and as condi-
tions become worse, C learns of a way he could earn extra money; he 
could capture, skin, and sell the pelts of the wild dogs that overpopulate 
the woods near his farm. C, however, would consider it immoral to do 
this. A may be able to convince C that the norm he is bound by has  
begun to detrimentally contravene the most basic human impetus of  
survival (a definitively plausible “goal”), and thus, C should skin the 
dogs and sell their pelts.268 
Facially, Chinese conformity to American norms can no more be 
deemed an “improvement” than can American conformity to Chinese 
norms, absent a functional argument.269 In other words, it is useless to 
imagine the two nations as siblings, one of which is normatively better-
behaved. At best, one can try to understand why norms differ among  
cultures, but even the resulting explanations may be too speculative.  
Regardless of whether a norm is “adaptive to a plausible need or goal,” 
the origin of the norm (meaning the societal conditions present that 
caused, or at least allowed for, its spread) may be indeterminable.270 Still, 
some logical inferences are plausible. For example, if A and B are both 
necessary conditions for X, then the existence of X presupposes A and B. 
With respect to norms regarding the treatment of animals, similar deduc-
tions are possible. If it is demonstrable that international free trade serves 
the mutuality of economic prosperity (i.e., wealth), and that wealth is 
necessary for the spread of animal welfare ideals,271 it might be logical to 
propose next that free trade improves the overall treatment of animals 
                                                                                                                                     
 267. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 268. One Chinese official who seeks an end to the inhumane slaughter of dogs and cats 
has implied that this hypothetical is not far from reality in the impoverished parts of his 
nation. See discussion supra Part II.A; supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 269.  Cf. POSNER, supra note 34, at 21 (explaining that the only grounds for criticizing 
a moral norm is per whether or not it is “adaptive to any plausible or widely accepted 
need or goal of the societies in question”). 
 270. Id. at 21–23. 
 271. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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within a society. This claim actually finds some support in humanistic 
psychology, specifically within Abraham Maslow’s 1943 paper “A 
Theory of Human Motivation.”272 
Maslow’s approach to psychology is significant because, while theoret-
ical, it is similar to Posner’s approach to morality. Maslow holds certain 
basic human ends as biologically universal, but acknowledges that the 
means adopted toward those ends may vary by culture, and thus, he  
examines behavior per its pursuit of these intuitive motivating ends only.273 
Maslow’s most noteworthy contribution is his “hierarchy of needs,” 
which posits that human behavior is driven largely by needs that can be 
ranked in order of importance.274 At the bottom of Maslow’s hierarchy 
are the essential physiological needs like food and water; then, moving 
up the ladder, humans strive for “safety,” “belonging,” “esteem,” and 
finally, “self-actualization.”275 Maslow’s theory is relevant because it 
explains persuasively why a nation with a higher per capita standard of 
living would have more animal welfare activists. In such societies, it is 
faster and easier for citizens to travel up the hierarchy of need satisfaction 
in order to move on to more complex “self-actualizing” goals.276 
As a profession—and even as a hobby—activism requires funding. At 
the very least, this means activists require sufficient food, water, safety, 
shelter, and clothing.277 Animal welfare activism will not be viable in a 
society unless many other needs can easily be met first with stable con-
sistency.278 Furthermore, since activism is not productive of wealth, it 
cannot exist unless other members of society divert a surplus of wealth to 
                                                                                                                                     
 272. Maslow taught psychology at Brandeis University from 1951 to 1969. 
 273. See Abraham Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370, 
371–72 (1943) (“Motivation theory is not synonymous with behavior theory. The motiva-
tions are only one class of determinants of behavior. While behavior is almost always 
motivated, it is also almost always biologically, culturally and situationally determined as 
well.”). 
 274. See id. at 394. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. at 393 (“[O]ur needs usually emerge only when more prepotent needs have 
been gratified.”). 
 277. See id. 
 278. See SOWELL, supra note 124, at 7 (“Food reaches [the civilized accountant’s] 
local supermarket through processes of which he is probably ignorant . . . . He lives in a 
home constructed by an involved process whose technical, economic, and political intri-
cacies are barely suspected, much less known to him.”). See also POSNER, supra note 34, 
at 27 (“A nation that lacks the resources necessary to educate its entire population will 
have to make painful choices . . . . It would be fatuous to think such a nation morally . . . 
backward and to suppose that its situation could be improved by preaching to it.”). 
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its funding.279 In sum, animal welfare is not likely to be a legitimately 
widespread societal goal until wealth and stability are legitimately wide-
spread within society. Moreover, even if sufficient wealth is attained in a 
society, childhood education (familial and public) must at the very least 
remain neutral on the subject of animals. Just as Americans have  
ingrained beliefs about dogs and cats, other cultures can impart starkly 
different perceptions—e.g., that dogs and cats are evil—and this could 
prevent the development of mass sympathy for their plight. 
To be sure, these claims are intuitive, but by extension, they serve the 
argument that free trade improves the plight of animals not only by in-
creasing societal wealth but also by exposing traders to the differences 
that exist among cultures. Exposure to adversarial ideas, as John Stuart 
Mill famously argued, is necessary to the pursuit of “truth”280 and can 
also incite renewed curiosity as to the truth of one’s own ingrained  
beliefs.281 Still, while “trade” and “wealth” exhibit a discernible causal 
relationship, causation among the coexistence of “wealth,” “ideas,” and 
“behavior” is admittedly difficult to pin down.282 But some correlations 
are noteworthy nonetheless. For instance, it is frequently argued that the 
liberalization of China’s economy has gone hand in hand with the  
nation’s recent “human rights improvements.”283 And some political and 
                                                                                                                                     
 279. PETA depends on millions of dollars in donations to function. See supra note 58 
and accompanying text. 
 280. See MILL, supra note 27, at 38 (“He who knows only his own side of the case 
knows little of that.”). See also id. at 37 (“[O]n every subject on which difference of  
opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of con-
flicting reasons.”). 
 281. See id. See also POSNER, supra note 34, at 228 (explaining that exposure to ideas 
that contravene one’s presuppositions “incites doubt, and doubt incites inquiry, making 
[one] less of a dogmatic, [and] more of a pragmatic or at least open-minded” decision 
maker). 
 282. See ROBERT ALAN DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 70–71 
(1971). 
 283. President Bill Clinton believed “liberalized trade could weaken the Chinese leader-
ship’s grip on society as the nation’s private sector grows and its contact with the outside 
world increases.” Clinton Signs China Trade Bill, CNN.COM, Oct. 10, 2000, http://archives. 
cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/10/10/clinton.pntr/. Moreover, as a 2008 Back-
ground Note published by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs claimed, “The market-oriented reforms China has implemented over the past two 
decades have unleashed individual initiative and entrepreneurship. The result has been 
the largest reduction of poverty and one of the fastest increases in income levels ever 
seen.” Background Note: China, supra note 133. 
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economic theorists argue not only that trade is a boon to peace but also 
that history demonstrates trade barriers can be catalysts of war.284 
Even if many such speculations are not sufficiently verifiable, it is rea-
sonable to ask that Congress, at the very least, deliberate on the broader, 
less foreseeable implications of import bans when constituents begin 
calling for them. The debate between “force” and “persuasion” need not 
end when the majority rules out persuasion; the next step should be a 
careful cost-benefit analysis between the choices of “force” and “inaction.” 
B. The Dog and Cat Protection Act Is Unenforceable 
Ironically, the DCPA may actually be equivalent to “inaction” in that 
its enforceability is dubious at best.285 Thus, even if one rejects the above 
syllogistic speculation—that the DCPA is counterproductive to the 
spread of wealth and ideas and thus counterproductive to the spread of 
animal welfare ideals—one may at least admit that the law has been 
wasteful of time and U.S. resources. Writing about federal animal  
welfare laws, Cass Sunstein has recognized the widespread lack of  
enforcement.286 “It would be an overstatement to say that the relevant 
provisions are entirely symbolic[,]” Sunstein claims, “[b]ut because they 
are dependent on prosecutorial decisions, and because few prosecutors 
have them as a high priority, they have a largely expressive function. 
They say much more than they do. They express an aspiration, but one 
that is routinely violated in practice, and violated with impunity.”287 
The DCPA is not the first federal law governing the importation of fur, 
and many zealous activists are working to ensure that it will not be the 
last.288 At present, the Humane Society urges its website visitors to  
support the Dog and Cat Prohibition Enforcement Act (“DCPEA”), 
which is presently pending in the House of Representatives.289 The prime 
                                                                                                                                     
 284. See, e.g., Henry F. Grady, The Consequence of Trade Barriers, 198 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 35, 42 (1938) (explaining that trade barriers lead to “frictions and 
trade rivalries which may lead to war”); id. at 40 (noting that the practical elimination of 
foreign trade can have the same effect on an economy as war). 
 285. See Jean C. Yasuhara, Note, “Cruella De Vil” Revisited: The International Dog 
and Cat Fur Trade, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 421 (2000). 
 286. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1339. 
 287. Id. 
 288. PETA and the Humane Society ask visitors of their websites to support various 
pending legislative initiatives by contacting their congressional representatives. See supra 
note 56. 
 289. See H.R. 891, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2007); Dog and Cat Prohibition Enforcement 
Act Fact Sheet, http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/legislation/110_furlabeling_HR891.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2008). The statute is also pending in the Senate under the title 
“Truth in Fur Labeling Act.” S. 610, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2007). 
1040 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
reason to support this law, the activists insist (or, openly admit), is that 
the measures currently in place to keep dog and cat fur out of the United 
States are not sufficiently effective.290 The DCPEA is designed to seal a 
“loophole” in a 1951 law—the Fur Products Labeling Act (“FPLA”)291—
which requires that animal fur-bearing garments sold in the United States 
be properly labeled as to the species of animal if the value of the adorned 
fur exceeds $150.292 The loophole, as the activists point out, arises in that 
a $500 coat trimmed with $149 worth of fur is not subject to the sta-
tute.293 
Before looking closer at the merits of the pending DCPEA, a pressing 
question looms: if $149 worth of fur shows up at the border without a 
label, how do customs officials know whether it is dog, cat, rabbit, 
coyote, or fox? In reality, it seems they cannot.294 In fact, DCPA  
enforcement may have been practically impossible since the law’s incep-
tion.295 One commentator remarked succinctly that until border officials 
can instantaneously conduct fur DNA testing, they will be as helpless as 
consumers in differentiating the products.296 Meanwhile, overzealous 
enforcement efforts may lead to profiling and unwarranted obstruction of 
imports from Asian States.297 How would the DCPEA improve the 
present scenario? It would amend the 1951 FPLA so that all fur-bearing 
products would require labels indicating the “species,” regardless of the 
fur’s monetary value.298 
The most striking aspect of this straightforward measure is its conspi-
cuous absence from the 2000 DCPA; even today, Burlington Coat Factory 
prices the overwhelming majority of its coats below $150 total.299 But 
that observation is not worth dwelling on; the question going forward is 
whether the DCPEA would bring efficacy to the laws that have preceded 
it, and furthermore, whether such efficacy would come with hidden  
implications. 
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At this point, an analogy to the U.S. market for illegal drugs is un-
avoidable. While the DCPEA would be easy to enforce—all unlabeled 
fur would promptly be turned away—the law’s overall effectiveness is 
premised on the notion that exporters will label their fur truthfully.  
Cocaine exporters are surely aware on some level that their product can 
potentially harm its purchasers, yet they remain driven (presumably by 
profit, if not by dependence on prior investment) to push the drug across 
U.S. borders by any means necessary.300 Should the DCPEA prove too 
difficult to skirt with false labeling, fur farmers, who know their products 
are not even harmful to purchasers, may have greater incentives than 
drug dealers to turn to smuggling.301 For one, the proven existence of a 
market for their fur may cause them to feel unfairly oppressed by what 
they perceive as arbitrary and unjustifiable cultural prejudice.302 This 
could inspire sentiments of anti-Western self-righteousness, which harm 
perceptions of U.S. power while bestowing moral validation upon those 
who disobey.303 
Furthermore, smuggling fur is liable to be easier than smuggling drugs, 
especially if false labeling would be as difficult to police as could be  
expected. While one may presume that the DCPEA would preemptively 
deter false labeling, this should only be true for exporters who trade in 
more than just dog fur. For these traders, an injunction and damaged rep-
utation could impact future legitimate business deals, but for those with 
no alternatives other than to deal in dog fur or earn wages via domestic 
employment, taking the risk would be rational.304 Whether they are 
caught mislabeling or never try, the result is the same; fur farmers would 
have to smuggle the products in the underground economy or find other 
ways to earn income. 
The DCPEA is ultimately victim to a catch-22. The law is a response 
to the problem that border officials cannot distinguish unlabeled dog fur 
from unlabeled fox fur, but its effectiveness is premised on the ability of 
border officials to distinguish dog fur from fox fur when they are both 
labeled fox fur. In other words, the law is premised on the efficacy of the 
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“honor system” in labeling. Meanwhile, foreigners may find more honor 
in disobeying the law, lest they be inclined to willfully sigh in resigna-
tion at their unfortunate moral inferiority. 
To be sure, Section 1308(c)(5) of the DCPA additionally authorizes 
federal officials to pay “rewards” to citizens who furnish information 
regarding violation of the statute.305 Ironically, this may be the most  
effective way to enforce the law (albeit a questionable use of taxpayer 
funds). But more notably, this provision actually serves as additional 
evidence of the difficulty of enforcing the DCPA at the border; and as 
more evidence of such difficulty becomes clear, the likelihood that  
exporters will falsely label increases.306 Finally, and most significantly, if 
the DCPEA actually could be enforced effectively, this would only 
strengthen the incentive for Chinese officials to challenge the DCPA at 
the WTO. Ultimately, impoverished foreigners will wish to export fur to 
the United States so long as genuine demand renders it profitable. 
CONCLUSION 
Some Western animal rights activists preach intractable ideals under 
the guise of progressivism, but they do so with a fervor and single-
mindedness unbecoming of the thoughtful worldview they aspire to. 
Whereas the case for progressivism is often made by pointing to con-
servative extremes that are clung to unthinkingly and inflexibly, the case 
for pragmatism may best be made by demonstrating that progressive  
extremes can likewise be clung to unthinkingly and inflexibly.307 If the 
DCPA is an indication, attempts to spread Western animal welfare ideals 
globally may be contemporarily doomed, but the ideological tunnel  
vision and pervasive lack of pragmatism among activist initiatives may 
be a greater obstacle to the movement’s spread than resistance from  
imagined legions of “cold-hearted” opponents. 
A call for pragmatism has been central to the foregoing critique of the 
DCPA. The moral universalism of the animal welfare agenda has been 
challenged as naively presumptuous of Western superiority and substan-
tively flawed for its reliance on normative rather than functional moral 
criticism. As such, moral universalism has been condemned as an impro-
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per premise for the enactment of laws restrictive of trade—the result of 
which is nothing more than coercive economic punishment based on a 
powerful nation’s subjective (and largely hypocritical) disapproval of a 
weaker nation’s norms. Furthermore, the DCPA has been shown to con-
travene the provisions and underlying pro-trade principles of the GATT, 
meaning China could successfully challenge the law by filing a com-
plaint with the WTO. Finally, the DCPA has been deemed most imprac-
tical in that, if it were not so demonstrably unenforceable, it would per-
haps be even less productive of its goal. All in all, free trade has been 
endorsed for its rejection of force in favor of voluntary and transparent 
international dealings. 
The Humane Society has advocated for the pending DCPEA’s in-
creased labeling requirements by noting that “[c]onsumers making well-
informed decisions based on complete information is a cornerstone of a 
functioning market economy.”308 The DCPEA contradicts this worthy 
principle, however, in that, even if dog fur arrives at customs properly 
labeled as such, it would be rejected without regard to whether some U.S. 
consumers would be willing to purchase it knowingly from a retailer.  
Ultimately, placing the burden on U.S. fur buyers (as opposed to suppli-
ers) to test and properly label imported fur would be less restrictive of 
trade and better-suited to the regulatory goals of the DCPA. This is not 
the type of burden that need be imposed with respect to all imported 
products the U.S. legislature wishes to ban. But to those who would ask 
how best to draw that line, the GATT has already responded by setting 
out “narrow” Article XX exceptions to the agreement’s general obliga-
tions. These exceptions properly distinguish valid and invalid regulations 
per their “necessity” in preventing some form of objectively verifiable 
damage. Furthermore, the GATT is the best arbiter of the type of damage 
that merits prevention because any such determination represents a con-
tractual consensus among the parties subject to it and not merely one  
nation’s attempt at objective rule promulgation. As such, GATT jurispru-
dence offers the most pragmatic approach to equitable trade relations. 
Perhaps the defining difference between ideologues and pragmatists is 
the latter’s willingness to change course when new facts so dictate. In his 
book, The Audacity of Hope, forty-fourth President of the United States 
Barack Obama made a case for pragmatism in comparing “values” with 
“ideology.”309 “Values are faithfully applied to the facts before us,” he 
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said, “while ideology overrides whatever facts call theory into ques-
tion.”310 In the interest of Western values and sound policy, animal wel-
fare activists, sympathetic citizens, and lawmakers should collectively 
change course by ceasing advocacy of legislation that would improve 
enforcement of the DCPA or otherwise restrict international trade. 
Granted, a call for the imposition of costs on domestic businesses for the 
sake of animals may never be as popular among U.S. animal sympathizers 
(or as effective at luring them to the cause) in comparison to emotional 
calls for sanctioning the “repugnant” (that is, “different”) practices of 
foreign societies. But a more open-minded approach to the animal wel-
fare agenda may be absolutely necessary if Western ideals regarding the 
treatment of animals are ever to take hold globally. Thus, for those who 
claim to care for the plight of all animals (including humans) but have 
not yet expelled the dissonance of dog-trumps-fox favoritism, it might be 
wise to let nuance and pragmatic reasoning trump emotion when interna-
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